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COMMENTARIES
The Right to Arms: Does the Constitution
or the Predilection of Judges Reign?
ROBERT DOWLUT*
Introduction
The second amendment o the United States Constitution reads: "A
well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State,
the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed."
The right to keep and bear arms is at the forefront of various
emotional issues that confront society, especially the legal community.
Nevertheless, judges have an obligation to interpret the Constitution,
irrespective of their personal feelings, so as to carry out the intent of
the Framers. If judges abandon this obligation, the public will view
courts as political institutions, their decisions less rooted in the law
than in the personalities and politics of the individual judges, and will
view the courts as not expounding the law but rather as handing down
social policy in judicial dress to suit the perceived needs of the moment.'
Every constitutional guarantee is burdensome to society because it
places a barrier between the individual and government. Even con-
stitutional rights that we have come to regard as indispensable involve
this tension between individual freedom and state control. The right
to remain silent and have counsel present during a custodial interroga-
tion, for example, has been assailed by no less a jurist than Justice
White: "In some unknown number of cases the Court's rule will return
a killer, a rapist or other criminal to the streets and to the environment
* B.S., 1975, Indiana; J.D., 1979, Howard. Member, District of Columbia Bar; Practi-
tioner, Bethesda, Md. The assistance of Joanne Wagner in preparation of the manuscript is grate-
fully appreciated.-Ed.
1. Soon after Justice Douglas's appointment, Chief Justice Hughes gave the newcomer some
surprising advice: "You must remember one thing. At the constitutional level where we work,
ninety percent of any decision is emotional. The rational part of us supplies the reasons for
supporting our own predilections." Mason, William 0. Douglas: A Justice for All, Wash. Post
(Book World), Nov. 2, 1980, at 1, col. 1. Justice Douglas later called for the "watering down"
of the second amendment. Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 151 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
West Virginia Supreme Court Justice Richard Neely opined that "lawyers, certainly, who
take seriously recent U.S. Supreme Court historical scholarship as applied to the Constitution
also probably believe in the Tooth Fairy and the Easter Bunny." He admitted: "I did elaborate
manipulation of history in order to arrive at what I thought were just results." Waltz, Laying
Down the Law: How the Judge Rules, Wash. Post (Book World), Jan. 17, 1982, at 11, col. 1.
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which produced him, to repeat his crime whenever it pleases him." '
Citizens of the United States have never approved any constitutional
amendment as an idle exercise to protect nugatory rights or nebulous
entities. Underscoring this point, a commentator made this apt obser-
vation: "[C]onstitutions are not made to create rights in the people,
but in recognition of, and in order to preserve them, and that if any
are specially enumerated and specially guarded, it is only because they
are peculiarly important or peculiarly exposed to invasion.'"
The second amendment contains a number of ideas:
(1) a well-regulated militia;
(2) the security of a free state; and
(3) two separate rights of the people that may not be infringed-the
right to keep arms; and the right to bear arms.
The statement of one purpose behind the right to arms does not
limit the broader rights protected." Chief Justice John Marshall ad-
monished that the Constitution cannot take on the "prolixity of a legal
code. . . . [O]nly its great outlines should be marked. ... I Also,
the conditions and circumstances of the period require a finding that
while the stated purpose of the right to arms was to secure a well-regu-
lated militia, .the right to self-defense was assumed by the Framers.'
2. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 542 (1966) (White, J., dissenting).
Judge Malcolm Wilkey of the District of Columbia Circuit thinks the exclusionary rule should
be abandoned because "every scheme of gun control ... is doomed" by it. Wilkey, The Exclu.
sionary Rule: Why Suppress Valid Evidence?, 62 JUDICATURE 214, 224 (Nov. 1978).
3. 2 J. Tucker, TnE CoNsTITtrrION OF THE UNITED STATES 688 (1899).
4. The Constitution protects more than just the rights specifically mentioned by name in
the Bill of Rights or the fourteenth amendment. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486,
486 n.l. (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958); Thomas
v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945); NLRB v. American Pearl Button Co., 149 F.2d 311 (8th Cir.
1945); Wilson v. State, 33 Ark. 557 (1878) (the right to carry a pistol for hunting is protected,
even though art. II § 5, ARK. CONST., guarantees right for "common defense"); State v. Foutch,
96 Tenn. 242, 34 S.W. 1 (1896) (right to keep and bear arms guaranteed for self-defense and
protection of home and family, even though. art. I § 26, TENN. CONST., guarantees the right
for the "common defense").
N.C. CONST., art. I § 30 (formerly art. I § 24), tracks the language of the second amend-
ment. The right to defense of self and property was upheld in State v. Kerner, 181 N.C. 574,
107 S.E. 222, 225 (1921).
In State v. Johnson, 16 S.C. 187, 191 (1881), the court recognized an individual right by
stating that the concealed carrying of arms prohibition is valid "as far as may be consistent
with the right of the citizen to bear arms." S.C. CONST. art. I § 28 (1868) guaranteed the right
for the "common defense." Presently art. I § 20 tracks the language of the second amendment.
5. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819).
6. Nunn v. State, I Ga. 243, 251 (1846); State v. Dawson, 272 N.C. 535, 159 S.E.2d I,
9 (1968).
"The right to life was so far above dispute that authors were content merely to mention
it in passing. . . . [T]he strategic importance of the right to life lay in its great corollary or
defense: the law or right of self-preservation. This secondary right made it possible for a single
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol36/iss1/29
COMMENTARIES
"It is never to be forgotten that, in the construction of the language
of the Constitution ... , as indeed in all other instances where con-
struction becomes necessary, we are to place ourselves as nearly as possi-
ble in the condition of the men who framed that instrument."' Thus
courts must liberally construe the protections of the Bill of Rights to
carry out the Framers' intent.'
The approach that the Framers' intent is controlling will be followed
in this article. A strict interpretivist approach can cut both ways.9 On
the one hand, the right to arms is preserved as it existed in the eighteenth
century by limiting the right to those arms commonly possessed by
the people at that time and to their modern equivalents. On the other
hand, limiting the right to arms to that dimension, modern arms fall-
ing outside that dimension would lie outside the right to arms.'0
This article will demonstrate that the Framers intended that the second
amendment guarantee to the individual the right to keep and bear arms
for the following purposes:
(1) to enable the individual to perform militia duties;
(2) to deter governmental oppression;
(3) to maintain public order; and
(4) to enable the individual to exercise his right to self-defense.
It will also demonstrate that the interpretation of this right by some
courts lacks logic and accuracy. These mistaken approaches view (1)
the right to arms as being exclusively collective rather than individual,
or (2) only applying to the right of a state to maintain a militia, or
man or a whole nation to meet force with force.... ." C. ROSsITER, SEEDTIME OF THE REPUBLIC
377 (1953); "It is a natural right which the people have reserved to themselves, confirmed by
the [English] Bill of Rights, to keep arms for their own defence." BOSTON UNDER MILITARY
RULE 79 (0. Dickerson ed. 1936) (quote from a newspaper of the time); "The supposed quietude
of a good man allures the ruffian; while on the other hand, arms like laws discourage and keep
the invader and the plunderer in awe, and preserve order in the world as well as property."
I WRITINGS OF THOMAS PAINE 56 (Conway ed. 1894); and John Adams wrote, "arms in the
hands of citizens may be used at individual discretion . . . in private self-defence. . . ." 3 J.
ADAMS, A DEFE Ca OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
475 (1787-88).
7. Ex parne Bain, 121 U.S. 1, 12 (1887).
8. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 635 (1886); Engblom v. Carey, 677 F.2d 957, 962
(2d Cir. 1982).
9. Discussions of the opposing views to constitutional interpretation can be found in J.H.
ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980). On page 1 he defines interpretivism as judges deciding
constitutional issues confining themselves to enforcing norms that are stated clearly or implicitly
in the written Constitution. Noninterpretivism is where courts go beyond that set of references
and enforce norms that cannot be discovered within the four corners of the document. See also
A.M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962).
10. State v. Kerner, 181 N.C. 574, 107 S.E. 222, 224-25 (1921); State v. Kessler, 289 Or.
359, 614 P.2d 94, 98-99 (1980).
1983]
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(3) only preventing the impairment of a state's active, organized militia."
These decisions would lead one to believe that the second amendment
truly reads: "The right of states to keep militias and to arm them shall
not be infringed." However, the Framers did not select such restric-
tive language; they selected broader language to guarantee the people
the right to arms.
The Colonial Experience
The historical background of the colonial era reveals the occasion,
circumstances, concerns, and issues that served as the driving force
for guaranteeing the preexisting right to keep and bear arms by placing
it in a written constitution. The colonists discovered that war in the
11. Brown v. Chicago, 42 Ill. 2d 501, 250 N.E.2d 129, 131 (1969); State v. Vlacil, 645 P.2d
677, 679 (Utah 1982) (per Hall, C.J., & Crockett, J.). Cf. People v. Liss, 406 Il. 419, 94 N.E.2d
320, 323 (1950).
For the first time in this nation's history, in Quilici v. Village of Morton Grove, 695 F.2d
261 (7th Cir. 1982), aff'g 532 F. Supp. 1169 (N.D. Ill. 1981), a divided court brushed aside
the second and fourteenth amendments and the Illinois arms guarantee arguments to uphold
an ordinance bani.ng the private possession of all handguns, even in the home. The court found:
(1) the second amendment applies only to action by the federal government, but failed to address
evidence and arguments on incorporation through the fourteenth amendment (notes 85, 95, 98,
99, 173 infra); (2) it ignored the "historical analysis of the development of English common
law and the debate surrounding the adoption of the second and fourteenth amendments. This
analysis has no relevance on the resolution of the controversy before us." Evidence to refute
this puzzling view is found in Malcolm, The Right of the People to Keep and Bear Arms: The
Common Law Tradition, 10 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. (in press 1983) & notes 6 supra, 41-99, 173
infra; (3) citing no authority, the court made the blanket claim that "the right to keep and
bear handguns is not guaranteed by the second amendment" and "we do not consider individually
owned handguns to be military weapons." Evidence refuting this claim is found in notes 51,
52, 118, 119, 122, 126-132 infra (notes 52 & 129 show the militia used privately owned handguns
in WW II); notes 6 supra, 20, 29, 31, 34, 115, 129, 132, 149, 151-158, 164 infra (handguns
are constitutional arms). The court's lack of intellectual precision carried over to its analysis
of the Illinois state constitutional guarantee. The court incongruously held "the term arms in
section 22 [of art. I, IL. CoNsT.J includes handguns," but "a ban on handguns does not violate
that right," relying on Delegate Foster's floor debates statements. However, Foster more broadly
claimed that in Cook County (Chicago) "all firearms whatsoever" could be banned. 3 ILL.
CONST. CONVEN. PROCEEDINGS 1718 (1969-1970). The floor debates further reveal a lack of con-
sensus. E.g., Delegate Hutmacher cited People v. Zerillo, 219 Mich. 635, 189 N.W. 927 (1922)
(noncitizen has a right to keep a handgun) in support of the majority report, which supported
a right to bear arms. Id. at 1707. Delegate Hendren, owner of "two shotguns and a pistol,"
supported the majority report because it prevented confiscation. Id. at 1712-13. In support of
the arms guarantee the majority report listed permissible regulations to harmonize the right with
the exercise of the police power. 6 PROCEEDINGS 88-90. Banning handguns was not listed as per-
missible regulation, and efforts to give handguns no constitutional protection failed. 7 PRO.
CEEDINGS 2901 (proposal 131); Legal & Research Advisor's Memo No. 25 (2-18-70). The voters'
intent controls the meaning, for the debates lack consensus and show a reluctance to face a
controversial issue ["I'd wish I'd never seen this thing." (Delegate Foster) 3 PROCEEDINGS 1721].
Board of Educ. v. Bakalis, 54 Ill. 2d 448, 299 N.E.2d 737, 751-52 (1973) (Ryan, J., concurring).
The evidence is "large majorities oppose an outright ban on private handgun ownership ...
Majorities approaching 90% believe they have a constitutional right to own a *gun." Wright
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol36/iss1/29
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New World was quite different from the European modes of warfare
they had left behind. The American Indian did not follow Grotius or
Vattel's rules on the proper limits of warfare. The Indians had no inter-
national aristocracy, no conventions, and had a code of warfare of
their own. They were not persuaded of the advantages of limited war-
fare waged only during clear weather in open field, nor were they ac-
customed to pitched battles and the trumpet-heralded attack. The
Indians struck without warning and were a nightly terror in the remote
silence of backwoods cabins. Every section of the seacoast suffered
massacres. Moreover, the threat from such Indian warfare did not dis-
appear until ten years after the defeat of Custer's force in 1876 on
the Little Bighorn River in Montana." Thus, the Framers were cer-
tainly concerned with the threat posed to national security by Native
Americans.
Nor were Indians the only threat to security. Parts of the English
colonies suffered intermittent threats of invasion by the French, the
Dutch, and the Spanish. The earliest Virginia settlers were often in
terror that the Spanish massacre of the Huguenots at Fort Caroline
in Florida might be repeated in their own province.'3
All colonists were soldiers in such warfare because all lived on the
battlefield. The bravery of women became commonplace, and anyone
who waited for the arrival of "troops" did not last long. " The colonists'
reliance on arms was such that an Anglican minister could write from
Maryland in 1775:
Rifles, infinitely better than those imported, are daily made in many
places in Pennsylvania, and all the gunsmiths everywhere constantly
employed. In this country, my lord, the boys, as soon as they can
discharge a gun, frequently exercise themselves therewith, some a
fowling and others a hunting. The great quantities of game, the
many kinds, and the great privileges of killing making the
Americans the best marksmen in the world, and thousands sup-
port their families by the same, particularly riflemen on the fron-
tiers, whose objects are deer and turkey. In marching through
woods one thousand of these riflemen would cut to pieces ten
thousand of your best troops."
& Rossi, Weapons, Crime, and Violence in America (Executive Summary) 17 (U.S. Justice Dep't,
Nov. 1981). See also note 87 infra. The lack of intellectual precision reveals Quilici as a dis-
ingenuous maneuver to turn a constitutional guarantee into an intangible abstraction. At this
juncture it is appropriate to be mindful of Madison's concerns about "a standing army, an enslaved
press, and a disarmed populace." R. KETCHAM, JAMES MADISON 640 (1971).
12. D. BOORsTIN, THE AMERICANS-THE COLONIAL EXPERIENCE 347-48 (1958).
13. Id. at 348.
14. Id. at 349-50.
15. Id. at 351.
19831
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These experiences prompted the inclusion of the right to keep and bear
arms in the Federal Constitution.
[E]verybody here was a bit of a soldier, none completely so.
War was conducted without a professional army, without generals,
and even without "soldiers" in the strict European sense. The
Second Amendment to the Federal Constitution would provide:
"A well-regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free
State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not
be infringed.""
Such a view was uniquely American. In Europe rulers were reluc-
tant to put the means of revolt into the hands of their subjects. However,
in America "the requirements for self-defense and food-gathering had
put firearms in the hands of nearly everyone."'7 The feeling was that
"[i]f the government be equitable; if it be reasonable in its exactions;
if proper attention be paid to the education of children in knowledge,
and religion, few men will be disposed to use arms, unless for their
amusement, and for the defence of themselves and their country."'"
The necessity of self-defense against criminal attacks was also a reason
for keeping and bearing arms. As early as 1697 there were complaints
that Philadelphia was becoming invested with "pirates and rogues,"
and in that year, William Penn felt strongly enough to write that "there
is no place more overrun with wickedness than Philadelphia."'' 9
The following excerpt from a letter written from Falmouth, Virginia,
on July 29, 1764, by William Allason, a merchant, to Messrs. Boyle
and Scott, merchants in Glasgow, is instructive on the defensive pistol-
carrying habits of civilians.
20
As it is sometimes dangerous in traveling through our wooden
Country Particularly at this time when the Planters are pressed
for old Ballances, we find it necessary to carry with us some defen-
sive Weapons, for that purpose, you'll be pleased to send us by
some of the first Ships for this River a pair of Pistols about 30/
[shillings] Price. Let them be small, for the convenience of carry-
ing in a side Pockett, and as neat as the Price will admit of.
16. Id. at 351-52.
17. Id. at 352-53.
18. Id. at 353.
19. Peace Bonds and Criminal Justice in Colonial Philadelphia, PA. MAGAZINE OF HISTORY
& BIOG. 183 (Apr. 1976).
20. ALLASON LETTER BOOK 1757-1770, f.134 (Va. State Library). It was considered normal
for eighteenth-century civilians to carry pocket pistols for protection while traveling. G.
NEUMANN, THE HISTORY OF WEAPONS OFTHE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 150-51 (1967). Because con-
cealed carrying was lawful when the Constitution was adopted, a concealed carrying statute was
voided in Bliss v. Commonwealth, 12 Ky. 90 (1822).
[Vol. 36:65
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Furthermore, self-defense was not simply a response to colonial con-
ditions but had long been protected as a natural right at common law.21
Until late in the seventeenth century England had no standing army
and until the nineteenth century no regular police force. An armed
and active citizenry was an English institution because the maintenance
of order was everyone's business. Men were required to perform militia
and posse duty.22
The colonies continued and expanded upon this common law in-
stitution, and their belief in it profoundly influenced the development
of the American system of government.23 Our Constitution should thus
be interpreted by reference to the common law and to English institu-
tions that shaped its adoption.24
The Revolutionary War
The nation that was to rebel was but a string of separate colonies,
21. One is allowed to repel force with force and the laws permit the taking up of arms against
armed men. I E. CoKE, INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 162a and 2 INSTITuTES 574 (Johnson
& Warner ed. 1812) (English translation).
Every private person is authorized by the law to arm himself against dangerous rioters and
those engaged in forcible entry or detainer. 1 W. HAWKINS, A TREATISE ON THE PLEAS OF THE
CROWN 170-71 (7th ed. 1795).
Personal security and self-defense are natural rights. Possession of arms for self-defense
was recognized. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND * 129-30, * 143-44
and 3 COMMENTARIES *3-.4.
The right of self-defense is founded in the law of nature and cannot be superseded by any
law of society. The right of self-defense resides in individuals. Deadly force may be used to
prevent felonies such as robbery, murder, rape, and arson or burglary in the habitation. M.
FOSTER, CROWN CASES 273-74 (London 1776).
22. J. MALCOLM, DIsARmED: THE Loss OF THE RIGirH TO BE.AR ARmS IN RESTORATION ENGLAND,
5 (Bunting Inst. of Radcliffe College 1980) (reprinted by National Rifle Ass'n, Washington, D.C.).
23. Id. at 1.
24. Exparte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87, 108-09 (1925). The common law, however, serves only
as a historical background and may not be invoked to abrogate constitutional rights. "At the
Revolution we separated ourselves from the mother country, and we have established a republican
form of government, securing to the citizens of this country other and greater personal rights,
than those enjoyed under the British monarchy." Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 264 n.7
(1941) (emphasis added). See also Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 248-49 (1936).
The British press was subject to licensing. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *152.
The British do not have a written constitution. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 523
n.46 (1969). Although a constitutional guarantee's "historic roots are in English history, it must
be interpreted in light of the American experience, and in the context of the American con-
stitutional scheme of government rather than the English parliamentary system. We should bear
in mind that the English system differs from ours in that their Parliament is the supreme authority,
not a coordinate branch." United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 508 (1972).
The constitutional right to arms protects greater rights than the English common law and
abrogates the Statute of Northampton banning the carrying of arms in public. Simpson v. State,
13 Tenn. 356, 359-60 (1833). However, the Statute of Northampton was narrowly construed
to require evil intent in carrying arms. Rex v. Knight, 87 Eng. Rep. 75 & 90 Eng. Rep. 330
(K.B. 1686).
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separately governed, and each concerned with different economies, some
with fishing or tobacco and others with farming or the fur trade.2
Their link was their common allegiance to the Crown and their inheri-
tance of the English common law. They also shared the unique exper-
ience of living on a new continent.
The French and Indian War introduced the English to an unac-
customed kind of warfare. The French and their Indian guerrillas
did not restrict their full-scale war to pitched battles, but also utilized
the ambush and hit-and-run techniques,6 which have become the
hallmark of modern guerrilla warfare. Learning from their experi-
ences, the colonists used French and Indian guerrilla techniques to their
advantage in the Revolutionary War. The French and Indian War taught
the futility of European battle lines in the wilderness, and the colonists
took a new and confident view of their ability to defend themselves.
The war brought new territory and saddled the English with new
taxes and an increased national debt. It also reminded them that the
new frontier would have to be defended. The colonies, however, had
no desire to raise their own troops or to pay through taxation for the
maintenance of British troops. A legislative response to the situation
came in 1765.with Parliament's passage of the Stamp Act. Paradox-
ically, this tax measure and other tax measures and trade restrictions
did not solve the problem of colonial security but instead united the
colonists in a common cause against the Crown. No longer a symbol
of common allegiance but a symbol of tyranny, the Crown moved the
colonists beyond an initial desire for autonomy within the Empire to
revolution and independence.2' The early riots and tarring and feathering
of revenue agents escalated into the Boston Massacre of 1770 and finally
turned into the Revolutionary War with the battles at Lexington and
Concord, Massachusetts, in 1775.8
Reports that minutemen had stored a large supply of gunpowder
in Concord prompted British General Gage to send out his men to
seize and destroy the supply. He intended to surprise them, but as is
well known, Paul Revere and William Dawes warned the colonists and
Gage's attempted bloodless coup became the first battle of the Revolu-
tionary War.9
25. 1 R. CURRENT, T. WILLIAMS & F. FREIDEL, AMERICAN HISTORY: A SURVEY 64-65 (3d
ed. 1971). "Fire and water are not more heterogeneous than the different colonies in North
America." Id. at 85.
26. Id. at 90-91.
27. Id. at 94-98.
28. Id. at 102-03, 107-08.
29. Id. at 108. Paul Revere's pistol is at the National Guard Ass'n Museum in Washington, D.C.
[Vol. 36:65
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol36/iss1/29
COMMENTARIES
The British did not intend merely to confiscate stores and magazines
of arms and ammunition. They also intended to strip individuals of
their arms, for in a revolutionary crisis an armed person with suspect
loyalties was as much of a threat as stores and magazines. Such people
had harassed and killed with gunfire British troops on the road from
Concord back to Boston following the first battle of the war. Further-
more, the armed citizenry served as a manpower pool from which the
patriots summoned men to perform militia duties.
By disarming suspect persons, the British felt confident that the
revolution would be crushed.30 In Boston, for exampile, General Gage
confined the inhabitants within the town and ordered them to surrender
their arms to their own magistrates (that they might be supposedly
preserved for their owners) as a condition for being able to depart
from the town. He then ordered his troops to seize the arms, detained
the greatest part of the inhabitants despite his promise to release those
who complied with his terms, and compelled the few who were able
to depart to leave their most valuable effects behind.3'
The disarming of the populace as the precursor of tyranny is not
merely a historical phenomenon. Totalitarian governments of the right
and left in the twentieth century have followed Gage's example.
32
30. In England, Catholics formed an important exception to the tolerant attitude toward
individual ownership of arms. Since the English Reformation they had been regarded as poten-
tial subversives and were liable to have their arms impounded. In times of tension their homes
might be searched and all weapons removed. Malcolm, supra note 22, at 7.
While at Boston a general effort was made to disarm the people, it is incredible to think
that other efforts to disarm suspect people did not occur and that the British were cheerfully
willing to allow people with suspect loyalties to roam at will while armed. Newspapers reported
the British seizures of arms and efforts by patriots to secure arms. 2 VA. GAZETTE INDEX
1736-1780, at 30-31 & 884 (L. Cappon & S. Duff eds. 1950).
The war proved that even women could be suspect. It is estimated that 6% of those involved
in the Revolutionary War were women. Dulin, Women: Has the Battle Ended or Just Begun?,
NATIONAL GUARD 20 (Jan. 1981). "Even weamin had firelocks. One was seen to fire a blunder
buss between her father and husband, from their windows.... ." THE SPIIT OF 'SEVErrTY-SIx
78 (H. Commager & R.B. Morris eds. 1967).
31. The disarmament of Bostonians would later be listed as one of the grievances justifying
the Revolutionary War. DOCUMENTS ILLUSTRATIVE OF THE FORMATION OF THE UNION OF AMERICAN
STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 398, 69th Cong., Ist Sess. 14-15 (1927).
The Bostonians surrendered 1,778 muskets, 634 pistols, and 38 blunderbusses. R. FROTHING-
HAM, HISTORY OF THE SEiGE OF BOSTON AND OF THE BATTLES OF LEXINGTON, CONCORD, AND
BUNKER HnL 95 (6th ed. 1903). By July, 1775, Boston's population of 17,000 declined to 7,000
civilians. Tan SPIRT oF 'SIavarrY-Six 146 (H. Commager & R.B. Morris, eds. 1967).
32. "The-surrender of guns and other implements of war has been ordered by special pro-
clamation." R. LEMKIN, Axis RULE IN OCCUPIED EUROPE; LAWS OF OCCUPATION, ANALYSIS OF
GOVERNMENT, PROPOSALS FOR REDRESS 591 (Carnegie Endowment for Int'l Peace, Washington,
D.C. 1944).
"Anybody posting a placard the Germans didn't like would be liable to immediate execution,
and a similar penalty was provided for those who failed to turn in firearms or radio sets within
19831
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Familiarity with the terrain, experiences with backwoods skirmishes
and the French and Indian War, an armed citizenry, and the colonial
militia structure were each factors that tipped the scale in favor of
the colonists. The colonial militia system was not the least important
of these factors. It subjected virtually all males to militia service,33 re-
quiring by law that they furnish themselves with arms and ammunition.
4
Men who remained unlisted on militia rolls," who failed to appear
when summoned, or who appeared without the required arms were
guilty of offenses punishable by fine. 6 Colonial law even required per-
sons exempt from training to keep arms and ammunition at home.37
twenty-four hours." W. SHIRER, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE THIRD REICH; A HISTORY OF NAZI
GERMANY 1027 (1960).
The Nazis seized Albert Einstein's bank account for a weapons violation: the possession of
a common knife in his home. I J. TOLAND, ADOLPH HITLER 325 (1976). "The repression con-
tinued with issuance of a series of harsh edicts ... such as the one to surrender all arms im-
mediately or be shot." Hitler, however, during the early stages of his climb to power, got a
pistol permit from the sympathetic police. I ADOLPH HITLER, supra, at 86-87, 120.
"Owning a pistol meant an obligatory conviction for terrorism. . . ." I A. SOLZHENITZYN,
THE GULAG ARCHIPELAGO 195 (T. Whitney tr. 1974). The right to have firearms or other weapons
is forbidden and self-defense is also curtailed. 2 THE GULAG ARCHIPELAGO 431-32.
George Orwell, author of 1984, noted that the Russian revolution and the Irish civil war
were political factors that prompted the passage of restrictive gun laws. B. Bruce-Briggs, The
Great American Gun War, 45 PUBLIC INTEREST 37, 61 (1976). Today draconian gun laws are
an ugly form of repression often cloaked in liberal trappings.
33. A New York militia statute of May 6, 1691, subjected males from 15 to 60 to militia
duties. I THE COLONIAL LAWS OF NEW YORK FROM THE YEAR 1664 TO THE REVOLUTION 231
(1894).
A 1705 Virginia statute subjected males from 16 to 60 to militia duties. 3 LAWS OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE FIRST SESSION OF THE LEGISLATURE IN THE YEAR 1619, 335 (W. Hening ed. 1823).
34. The arms and equipment a New York militiaman was required to furnish himself included
a "muskett or fuzee . . . pike . . . Sword . . . Lance . . . pistoll . . . case of good pistolls
... rapier... carabine... poweder... bulletts.. ." 1 THE COLONIAL LAWS OF NEW YORK,
supra note 33, at 232.
In Virginia the list included "a firelock, muskett or fusee well fixed, a good sword and car-
touch box, and six charges of powder . . . at his place of abode two pounds of powder and
eight pounds of shott . . . holsters . . . a-case of pistolls well fixed, sword . . . carabine.
." 3 LAWS OF VIRGINIA, supra note 33, at 338.
35. No person whatsoever from 16 to 60 shall remain unlisted on penalty of a fine of 20
shillings. 2 THE COLONIAL LAWS OF NEW YORK, supra note 33, at 84-85.
36. Failing to appear was punishable by a fine of 20 shillings. 2 THE COLOAL. LAWS OF NEw
YORK, supra note 33, at 85.
Failing to appear, or appearing without the required arms and ammunition, or failing to
keep at his abode the required arms and ammunition were offenses punishable by a fine of 100
pounds of tobacco. 3 LAws OF VmGInA, supra note 33, at 338.
37. "That all persons though ffreed from Training by the Law yet that they be obliged to
Keep Convenient armes and ammunition in Their houses as the Law directs To others." I THE
COLONIAL LAWS OF NEW YORK, supra note 33, at 161.
Persons exempted from enrollment and service in the militia were "required and enjoyned
to provide and keep at their respective places of abode . . . arms and ammunition." 3 LAWS
OF VIRGINIA, supra note 33, at 337.
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol36/iss1/29
COMMENTARIES
The American Revolutionary War was the progenitor of the modern
wars against colonialism, and the war had features that made it revolu-
tionary in itself. The contest was not the conventional struggle of small
numbers of professional soldiers, but rather the people on the American
side took up arms in their own cause against professional soldiers. A
total of almost 400,000 men.enlisted, most for short terms, and fought
during the eight-year war.38 George Washington could muster only about
19,000 poorly armed and trained citizens, including both continentals
and state militia, against General Sir William Howe's hundreds of ships
and 32,000 disciplined soldiers.
39
The contest turned into a prolonged war of attrition, the American
victory at Yorktown finally provoking outcries in England against con-
tinuing the war. America's force of arms ended the fighting, and
diplomatic skills finally won the war with the signing of the Treaty
of Paris in 1783.40
Legislative History of the Second Amendment
The Americans desired a written constitution, for it was felt a con-
stitution should contain "a fixed and definite body of principles."'
Responding to these desires, the delegates in Philadelphia produced
a document that was a product of political differences and bickering.
James Madison observed that the Constitution was "in strictness, neither
a national nor a federal Constitution, but a composition of both."'
4
It was brief and contained ambiguities, which left room for a variety
of interpretations, and thus was born the loose construction versus strict
construction debate.
One of the major problems confronting the delegates was how to
reconcile their fear of a standing army with the need to defend their
fledgling nation. Although useful for national defense, a standing army
was considered generally inimical to personal freedom and liberty. The
delegates, however, were unwilling to forego completely the bolstering
38. 1 AMERICAN HISTORY, supra note 25, at 111.
39. Id. at 120-21.
40. Id. at 126-29. Professor William Marina noted that one need not go to the writings of
Mao or Vo Nguyen Giap to learn about the principles of revolutionary warfare. The events
of the American Revolution are filled with examples of the discovery and working out of the
essentials of those principles. For example, the American patriot David Ramsay was talking about
a "people's war" long before Mao Tse-tung. Washington was writing about an American strategy
to "protract" the conflict many years before Communist tacticians worked out a plan for "pro-
tracted conflict." Marina, The American Revolution as a People's War, REASON 28, 29 (July
1976).
41. Id. at 101.
42. Id. at 145.
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of national defense through a standing army and developed a com-
promise position.
They formulated affirmative safeguards to prevent the military from
accruing too much power by granting the federal legislative branch
the authority to raise a standing army,43 "for governing such Part"
of the militia when "in the service of the United States,"" and to
call forth "the Militia to execute the laws of the Union, suppress In-
surrections and repel Invasions.''45 They further established congres-
sional control by specifying that military funding could be appropriated
for not longer than two years46 and that the power to declare war was
reserved to the legislative branch,47 although the President was to be
Commander in Chief.
4 8
Although a state could not "keep Troops" without congressional
consent,9 the delegates limited the authority of Congress over state
militias because congressional authority extended only to the part of
"the Militia" employed in the service of the United States.0 This in-
dicates that an important distinction was made between "troops" and
"militia,''" and that there existed a residual militia that was not sub-
ject to congressional control.2 The complexity was a safeguard to pre-
vent a single.group of armed forces or combination of groups from
ever gaining absolute and unchecked power.
43. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 12.
44. Id. at cl. 16.
45. Id. at cl. 15.
46. Id. at cl. 12.
47. Id. at cl. 11.
48. Id., art. II, § 2.
49. Id., art. 1, § 10, cl. 3.
50. Id., art. I, § 8, cl. 16.
51. Troops are "soldiers collectively-a body of soldiers." So. Pac. Co. v. United States,
285 U.S. 240, 244 (1932). The word "troops" conveys to the mind the idea of an armed body
of soldiers, whose sole occupation is war or service answering the regular army. Dunne v. Peo-
ple, 94 111. 120, 138 (1879).
The "militia" is all able-bodied men between 18 and 45. It is improbable the entire militia
of the state will ever be enrolled. "[A] state may organize such portions of its militia as may
be deemed necessary." Dunne, supra, 94 Ill. at 124, 132.
The "militia" does not mean the body of men organized under state authority who are known
as "state militia," but signifies that portion of the people who are capable of bearing arms-the
arms-bearing population. Ex parte McCants, 39 Ala. 107, 113 (1863).
The organization of active militia is not in violation of U.S. CoNsr., art I, § 10, cl. 3, as
such militia is simply a domestic force, as distinguished from regular troops, and is only liable
to be called into service when the exigencies of the state make it necessary. Dunne, supra, 94
Il at 138.
52. During WW l1 the national guard was activated by the federal government for overseas
duty, thus leaving the states, especially along the coasts, without protection. In a number of
states the governor called upon the reserve militia, the armed citizenry, to serve as a substitute
for the national guard. See, e.g., U.S. HOME DEFENSE FORCES STUDY 32, 34, 58, 60 (Office
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol36/iss1/29
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The delegates submitted the Constitution to the states for their ratifica-
tion. Nine state conventions had to ratify the Constitution, and by
December, 1787, Delaware, Pennsylvania, and New Jersey had easily
ratified it."
A minority faction in the Pennsylvania convention was the first to
make proposals for a Bill of Rights. On December 12, 1787, they made
fifteen proposals, and proposal seven specifically addressed the right
to bear arms:
That the people have a right to bear arms for the defence of
themselves and their own State, or the United States, or for the
purpose of killing game; and no law shall be passed for disarming
the people or any of them, unless for crimes committed, or real
danger of public injury from individuals; and as standing armies
in the time of peace are dangerous to liberty, they ought not to
be kept up; and that the military shall be kept under strict sub-
ordination to and be governed by the civil power."4
All fifteen proposals were defeated, 46 votes against and 23 for. 5
The convention then ratified the Constitution by the same margin.6
Nevertheless, the minority proposals influenced members of other state
conventions, and it is to these anti-Federalists we owe credit for a Bill
of Rights."
of Sec. of Defense, Mar. 1981). "State Guard Reserve units operated only in their own towns
or rural localities. Members served without pay and provided their own uniforms, arms, and
ammunition. Many of them belonged to gun clubs. .. ." Id. at 58.
In Maryland the reserve militia (presently recognized in MD. ANN. CODE., art. 65, §§ 1 &
5 (1979)) was called the Maryland Minute Men. 3 STATE PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF GOVERNOR
HERBERT R. O'CONOR 616-20 (1942). "Hence, the volunteers, for the most part, will be ex-
pected to furnish their own weapons. For this reason, gunners (of whom there are 60,000 licensed
in Maryland), members of Rod and Gun Clubs, of Trap Shooting and similar organizations,
will be expected to constitute a part of this new military organization." Id. at 618.
53. 1 AMIERicAN HISTORY, supra note 25, at 146.
54. PENNSYLVANIA AND THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 1787-1788, 422 (J. McMaster & F. Stone
eds. 1888). The Pennsylvania minority was the first to propose an extensive Bill of Rights and
their seminal ideas found their way into the Bill of Rights and became the first, second, fourth,
fifth, sixth, eighth, and tenth amendments. E. DUMBAULD, THE BILL OF RIGHTS AND WHAT IT
MEANS TODAY 50-56 (1957).
The Pennsylvania minority proposal reveals an intent to guarantee the traditional uses of
the times: for militia use, for self-defense, and for hunting. The reference to hunting was prob-
ably an effort to prevent the enactment of game laws designed to disarm the people. It also
demonstrates that the common understanding of "to bear arms" was not restricted solely to
militia purposes. In the eighteenth century "bear" meant "To convey or carry." S. JOHNSON,
A DICTIONARY OF THE ENousn LANGUAGE (unpaginated) (1979 reprint of 1755 ed.). The arms
provision of LA. CONST. tit. III, art. 60 (1845), used the term "carry arms."
55. PENNSYLVANIA AND THE FEDERAL CONSTrrTUnoN, supra note 54, at 424.
56. Id. at 425.
57. 1 AMERICAN HISTORY, supra note 25, at 147-48. Of all the anti-Federalists' specific
criticisms the most compelling was "the Constitution lacked a bill of rights."
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In Georgia and Connecticut the Constitution was easily ratified in
January, 1788,11 and Massachusetts followed in February, ratifying by
a margin of 53% for and 47% against.s9 Once again, a Bill of Rights
was proposed (this time by Samuel Adams) but was rejected. The section
on arms would have provided "that the said Constitution be never
construed to authorize Congress... to prevent the people of the United
States, who are peaceable citizens, from keeping their own arms."6
Between April and July, 1788, Maryland, South Carolina, New
Hampshire, Virginia, and New York completed the ratification process."
But most of these last states also agitated for inclusion of a Bill
of Rights and thus added momentum to the cause of the anti-Federalists.
When the New Hampshire convention gave the Constitution the ninth
needed vote for its adoption, it proposed that "Congress shall never
disarm any citizen, unless such as are or have been in Actual
Rebellion."62 Virginia also held the right to bear arms as necessary
to its proposed Bill of Rights:
That the people have a right to keep and bear arms; that a well-
regulated militia, composed of the body of the people trained to
arms, is the proper, natural, and safe defence of a free state; that
standing armies, in time of peace, are dangerous to liberty, and
therefore ought to be avoided, as far as the circumstances and pro-
tection of the community will admit; and that, in all cases, the
military should be under strict subordination to, and governed by,
the civil power.63
58. Id. at 146.
59. Id.
60. On Feb. 6, 1788, a number of amendments were proposed, including freedom of the
press, the right to petition, to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, and the right
to arms. All were rejected. DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS IN THE MASSACHUSETTS CONVENTION
86-87 (B. Peirce & C. Hale eds., Boston 1856). Samuel Adams made the proposals. Id. at 266.
Following the defeat of the proposals, Adams then voted for ratification of the Constitution.
Id. at 87. See also 2 B. SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 675 (1971).
61. 1 AMERICAN HISTORY, supra note 25, at 146, 148.
62. 1 DEBATES ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 326 (J. Elliot ed. 1836)
[hereinafter cited as ELLIOT'S DEBATES]. The Pennsyvlania and Massachusetts proposals on arms
are not found in the DEBATES.
63. 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES 659. Patrick Henry said: "The object is, that every man be armed.
... Every one who is able may have a gun." Id. at 386. Zachariah Johnson, a Virginian, said:
"The people are not to be disarmed of their weapons. They are left in full possession of them."
Id. at 646. Thomas Jefferson's proposed Virginia constitution, which was passed over for George
Mason's proposal, provided: "No freeman shall ever be debarred the use of arms." I PAPERS
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 344 (J. Boyd ed. 1950). Thomas Jefferson, James Madison, and George
Washington owned numerous guns. Tarassuk & Wilson, Gun Collecting's Stately Pedigree, AM.
RIFLEMAN, July 1981, at 22. See also Halsey, Jefferson's Beloved Guns, Am. RIFLEMAN, Nov.
1969, at 17.
[Vol. 36:65
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New York also submitted a proposal on arms that guaranteed a right
to keep and bear arms and provided that the militia included the body
of the people capable of bearing arms."
North Carolina and Rhode Island, citing the lack of a Bill of Rights,
initially voted down the Constitution5 and included a right to arms
as a condition of ratification.
66
The supporters of the Constitution expounded its meaning and
benefits during the fall and winter of 1787-1788 in a series of newspaper
articles, afterwards published in book form as The Federalist. James
Madison wrote that "the advantage of being armed" was a condition
"the Americans possess over the people of almost every nation." He
charged that the despots of Europe were "afraid to trust the people
with arms," and envisioned a militia amounting to near half a million
citizens "with arms in their hands."
67
The right to arms was also expounded in pamphlets by Noah
Webster6 and Richard Henry Lee.69 Like Madison, both supported
the concept of an armed citizenry as a deterrent to oppression.
When the conventions completed ratification, the number of amend-
ments proposed by the states reached 186.70 It is altogether unlikely
that the Constitution would have been ratified had it not been for the
64. "That the people have a right to keep and bear arms; that a well regulated militia, in-
cluding the body of the people capable of bearing arms, is the proper, natural, and safe defence
of a free state." I ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 62, at 327-28.
65. 1 AMERICAN HISTORY, supra note 25, at 146.
66. The North Carolina proposal on arms copied Virginia's proposal. 4 ELLIoT's DEBATES,
supra note 62, at 244. The Rhode Island proposal copied New York's. 1 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra
note 62, at 335.
67. THE FEDERALIST No. 46, at 299 (J. Madison) (Mentor Book ed. 1961). The population
in 1790 was 3,929,214. 1 AMERIcAN HISTORY, supra note 25, at 470. Since the state militias
in toto would not have amounted to half a million, Madison must have had in mind virtually
all males capable of bearing arms to serve as a deterrent to oppression.
68. Before a standing army can rule, the people must be disarmed; as they are in almost
every kingdom in Europe. The supreme power in America cannot enforce unjust
laws by the sword; because the whole body of the people are armed, and constitute
a force superior to any band of regular troops that can be, on any pretence raised
in the United States. A military force, at the command of Congress, can execute
no laws, but such as the people perceive to be just and constitutional; for they
will possess the power, and jealousy will instantly inspire the inclination to resist
the execution of a law which appears to them unjust and oppressive.
PAMPHLETS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 51, 56 (P. Ford ed. 1888).
In our system of checks and balances, the people are also a factor. The first and second
amendments have a common purpose, namely a safeguard against abuse of powers by government.
69. "[T]o preserve liberty, it is essential that the whole body of the people always possess
arms, and be taught alike, especially when young, how to use them.... ." LETTERS FROM THE
FEDERAL FARMER TO THE REPUBLICAN 124 (W. Bennett ed. 1978).
70. The figure becomes 210 if New York's preliminary recitals are added. Even with duplica-
tions eliminated, 80 substantive propositions emerged. DUMBAULD, supra note 54, at 32.
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general understanding that a Bill of Rights would be adopted,' given
the several states' felt need for guarantees of individual liberty.
Why were the amendments in the state conventions initially defeated?
The Federalists believed there was no need for them because the national
government was one of limited powers, and they derided the fears of
the anti-Federalists with sarcasm. For example, in Pennsylvania, Tench
Coxe noted, "Nothing was said about the privilege of eating and drink-
ing in the Constitution, but he doubted that any man was seriously
afraid that his right to dine was endangered by the silence of the Con-
stitution on this point.""
Echoing Coxe's sentiments, James Wilson argued in the Penn-
sylvania convention that since South Carolina, New Jersey, New York,
Connecticut, Rhode Island, and Georgia had no declaration of rights,
and no one could honestly say their inhabitants were oppressed, these
states had proved that a Bill of Rights was not an essential of a
republican government."'
The first Congress convened for the purpose of drafting a Bill of
Rights and delegated the task to James Madison. Madison did not see
the Bill of Rights as fixing, and therefore to a certain extent killing,
the living concept of individual rights. To Jefferson he had written
that he favored "a constitutional declaration of the most essential
rights," but, "at the same time I have never thought the omission a
material defect, nor been anxious to supply it even by subsequent amend-
ment, for any other reason than that it is anxiously desired by others.""'
He referred to his own proposals as "calculated to secure the personal
rights of the people so far as declarations on paper can.""'
Madison intended that the right to arms be an individual one, not
merely protecting states' rights to organize militias. This view is borne
out by his initial plan, later rejected by the House, to designate the
amendments as inserts between sections of the existing Constitution.
He did not designate the right to arms as an amendment o the martial
clauses of article I, sections 8 or 10. Madison placed it as a part of
a group of provisions (including freedom of religion and press) to be
inserted "in article 1st, Section 9, between clauses 3 and 4,"76 The
first three clauses of that section had been devoted to the few individual
71. Id. at viii.
72. R. RUTLAND, THE BIRTH OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS, 1776-1791, 137 (1955).
73. Id. at 140. Cf. "The State Declarations of Rights are not repealed by this Constitution;
and being in force are sufficient." (Roger Sherman of Connecticut), 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION OF 1787, at 588 (M. Farrand ed. 1974).
74. 11 PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 297 (1978).
75. 12 PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 258 (1979).
76. Id. at 201. See also DUMBAULD, supra note 54, at 207.
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rights protected in the original Constitution, relating to slavery, suspen-
sion of habeas corpus, bills of attainder, and ex post facto laws. Madison
apparently viewed the right to arms as related to rights of speech and
press, and more related to the existing civil rights than to congres-
sional or state powers over the militia.
The study of the developments in drafting the Bill of Rights is difficult
because Senate sessions were secret during the period when the right
to arms was under consideration, and neither house then kept a ver-
batim record of proceedings similar to the present Congressional Record.
The nearest equivalent is a publication known as the Annals of Con-
gress, a publication that scholars have found to be unreliable as well
as incomplete; it is not safe to rely on this source alone. Nor do the
Journals of the House and Senate for the first session of the First Con-
gress fill this void because they embody only actions taken by vote
of the respective bodies, and do not contain any account of the debates."
The intended meaning of the amendment can be learned not only
from what the drafters included in it but also from what they excluded
from it. In its initial format the right to arms included a provision
that "no person religiously scrupulous of bearing arms shall be com-
pelled to render military service in person." This was rejected after
opponents argued the federal government might arbitrarily use the pro-
vision to declare an individual religiously scrupulous, thereby denying
him the right to bear arms.78 Moreover, the Senate rejected a proposal
to insert the phrase "for the common defence" after the words "bear
arms,"179 thereby emphasizing that the purpose of the right to arms
was not merely to provide for the common defense but also to protect
the individual's right to keep and bear arms for his own self-defense.0
As mentioned above, the people of that era used arms to defend
themselves, to hunt, and to perform militia duties. The Revolutionary
War demonstrated that an armed citizenry served as a bulwark against
governmental oppression. Arms were an integral part of their culture.
The seven proposals on arms that surfaced in the state conventions
reflected the customary uses of arms, and two proposals did not assign
77. DUMBAULD, supra note 54, at ix.
78. 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS, 778 (1789). Rep. Gerry of Massachusetts stated:
This declaration of rights, I take it, is intended to secure the people against the
maladministration of the Government; if we could suppose that, in all cases, the
rights .of the people would be attended to, the occasion for guards of this kind
would be removed. Now, I am apprehensive, sir, that this clause would give an
opportunity to the people in power to destroy the Constitution itself. They can
declare who are those religiously scrupulous, and prevent them from bearing arms.
79. 1 HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 450 (J. Goebel, Jr. ed. 1971).
See also 2 B. SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 1153-54 (1971).
80. See notes 4 & 6 supra.
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a reason for a right to arms,8 thus protecting all customary uses. One
proposal assigned all of the customary uses, including hunting.2 The
remaining four had a militia nexus.8 3 However, in these four proposals
the arms right stood by itself as a declarative independent clause: "the
people have a right to keep and bear arms." The autonomy of the
clause supports an interpretation that arms kept for customary uses
is an unqualified right."'
The states would not have ratified the Constitution and the Bill of
Rights if they suspected that the second amendment did not guarantee
to their citizens the arms rights they already enjoyed.5 A newspaper
article of the day explains the various guarantees in the proposed Bill
of Rights and suggests the paramount importance attached to the in-
dividual's right to arms:
As civil rulers, not having their duty to the people duly before
them, may attempt to tyrannize and as the military forces which
must be occasionally raised to defend our country, might pervert
their power to the injury of their fellow citizens, the people are
81. Massachusetts and New Hampshire. See notes 60 and 62, supra.
82. Pennsylvania. See note 54, supra.
83. Virginia, New York, North Carolina, and Rhode Island. See notes 63, 64, and 66, supra.
84. See notes 4 & 6 supra.
85. Four state constitutions had a specific provision on arms: Pennsylvania, Vermont, North
Carolina, and Massachusetts. "That the people have a right to bear arms for the defence of
themselves and the State .. " PA. CONsT., Declaration of Rights, art. XIII (1776); VT. CONsT.,
ch. I, art. XV (1777). Those provisions were construed in Commonwealth v. Ray, 218 Pa. Super.
72, 272 A.2d 275, 278-79 (1970), vac. on other grounds 448 Pa. 307, 292 A.2d 410 (1972);
and State v. Rosenthal, 75 Vt. 295, 55 A. 610 (1903), to guarantee a private right to self-defense.
"That the people have a right to bear arms, for the defence of the State .... " N.C. CONST.,
Bill of Rights § 17 (1776). In State v. Huntley, 25 N.C. 418, 422-23 (1843), the court interpreted
this provision broadly: "For any lawful purpose-either of business or amusement-the citizen
is at perfect liberty to carry his gun."
"The people have a right to keep and bear arms for the common defence ... ." MASS.
CONST., art. XVII (1780). Concerns were voiced that the language was too narrow. "That the
people have a right to keep and bear arms for their own and Common Defence" was urged
as a better choice. THE POPULAR SOURCES OF POLITICAL AUTHORITY; DOCUMENTS ON THE
MASSACHUSETTS CONSTITUTION of 1780, 624 (0. & M. Handlin eds. 1966). This explains why
the Senate voted down "common defense" language in the second amendment. See note 79,
supra. The right to arms was judicially repealed in Commonwealth v. Davis, 369 Mass. 886,
343 N.E. 2d 847 (1976). The court also ignored favorable cases in sister states interpreting similar
"common defense" language. See notes 4 & 6 supra. Numerous courts have interpreted the sec-
ond amendment as an individual right not restricted to the militia. United States v. Bowdach,
414 F. Supp. 1346, 1353 n.1l (S.D. Fla. 1976); Nunn v. State, 1 Ga. 243 (1846); McKellar v.
Mason, 159 So. 2d 700, 702 (La. App. 1964), aff'd, 245 La. 1075, 162 So. 2d 571 (1964); State
v. Chandler, 5 La. Ann. 489, 490 (1850); In re Brickey, 8 Idaho 597, 70 P. 609 (1902); People
v. Liss, 406 Ill. 419, 94 N.E.2d 320, 323 (1950); State v. Nickerson, 126 Mont. 157, 247 P.2d
188, 192 (1952). See also State v. Anonymous, 179 Conn. 516, 519, 427 A.2d 403, 405 (1980).
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confirmed by the next article in their right to keep and bear their
private arms."
Early Views on the Right to Arms
Because the Framers' intent becomes less discernible with the passage
of time, the precedential value of cases tends to increase in proportion
to their proximity to the Convention of 1787.87 Thus, it would be helpful
to see what the early commentators said about the second amendment
and how early courts interpreted it.
Saint George Tucker (1752-1828) served as a colonel in the Virginia
militia, was wounded in the Revolutionary War, was a law professor
at William and Mary, and later was a justice on the Virginia Supreme
Court from 1804 to 1811. He was also a friend of Thomas Jefferson.
In 1803 he published a five-volume edition of Blackstone's Commen-
taries on the Laws of England."
To Blackstone's listing of the "fifth and last auxilliary right of the
subject . . . that of having arms . . . suitable to their condition and
degree, and such as are allowed by law," Tucker in a footnote added:
86. Federal Gazette and Philadelphia Evening Post, June 18, 1789, No. 68 of Vol. II, at
2, col. I (emphasis added). Tench Coxe in a letter to Madison admitted being the author. 12
PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 241 n.1 (1979). "Great weight has always been attached, and very
rightly attached, to contemporaneous exposition." Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264,
418 (1821).
87. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 547 (1969). The trend of early state constitutions,
at the time when Jefferson and Madison were still alive, was to guarantee the right to arms
for defense of self and the state. Ky. CONST., art. XII § 23 (1792); OHIO CONST., art. I § 20
(1803); IND. CONST., art. I § 20 (1816); MISS. CONST., art. I, § 23 (1817); CONN. CONST., art.
I § 17 (1818); ALA. CONST., § 23 of Declaration of Rights (1819); Mo. CONST., art. XIII
§ 3 (1820). TENN. CONST., art. XI § 26 (1796), and MAINE CONST., art. I § 16 (1820), guaranteed
the right to arms for the "common defense." This demonstrates that while the right to arms
was deemed important, there was no consensus on the precise language, probably because the
full enjoyment of the right at the time was taken for granted. A constitutional guarantee should
be read in a sense most obvious to the common understanding at the time of its adoption. Eisner
v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 220 (1920) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
"[M]ost Americans believe they have a [constitutional] right to own a gun." There is also
little support for an outright ban on handguns. Wright, Public Opinion and Gun Control: A
Comparison of Results From Two Recent National Surveys, 455 ANNALs OF Tr AM. ACADEMY
OF POL. & SOC. SCIENCE 34, 37, 38 (May 1981). See also FEDERAL REGULATION OF FIREARMS,
Report for Senate Comm. on the Judiciary by Cong. Research Service, 97th Cong., 2d Sess.,
261 (1982). The vast majority of citizens believe they have an individual.right to own a gun.
In the 1982 elections voters overwhelmingly adopted constitutional guarantees on arms in Nevada
and New Hampshire and rejected by a 2-to-i margin an initiative to register and freeze the number
of handguns in California. Omang & Morgan, Freeze Backers, Gun Lobby Hail Victories in
Ballot Referenda, Wash. Post, Nov. 4, 1982, at A26, col. 1.
88. THE RIGHT To KEEP AND BEAR ARMS, Report of Senate Subcomm. on Constitution of
the Judiciary Comm., 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 6-7, 60 (1982). '
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"The right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed."
He cited the second amendment, noting that it is "without any qualifica-
tion as to their condition or degree, as is the case in the British
government."89 He added: "Whoever examines the forest, and game
laws in the British code, will readily perceive that the right of keeping
arms is effectually taken away from the people of England."90
In discussing the second amendment, Tucker wrote:
This may be considered as the true palladium of liberty .... The
right of self defence is the first law of nature: in most govern-
ments it has been the study of rulers to confine this right within
the narrowest limits possible. Wherever standing armies are kept
up, and the right of the people to keep and bear arms is, under
any colour or pretext whatsoever, prohibited, liberty, if not already
annihilated, is on the brink of destruction. In England, the people
have been disarmed, generally, under the specious pretext of pre-
serving the game: a never failing lure to bring over the landed
aristocracy to support any measure, under that mask, though
calculated for very different purposes. True it is, their bill of rights
seems at first view to counteract this policy: but the right of bear-
ing arms is confined to protestants, and the words suitable to their
condition and degree, have been interpreted to authorize the pro-
hibition of keeping a gun or other engine for the destruction of
game, to any farmer, or inferior tradesman, or other person not
qualified to kill game. So that not one man in five hundred can
keep a gun in his house without being subject to a penalty."
Tucker thus merged self-defense, prevention of standing armies, and
protection from oppression all into a single concept-the generalized
right of keeping and bearing arms as protected by the second amendment.
William Rawle (1759-1836) was a Quaker, a correspondent of Thomas
Jefferson, and George Washington's choice as the first Attorney
General, an appointment Rawle declined. Like Tucker, he was in all
probability familiar with the affairs of the early government.92
In 1825 he published a textbook on the Constitution,3 and in
regard to the first clause of the second amendment, he wrote that a
disorderly militia is a disgrace; it must be well regulated. He also felt
that "[iun a people permitted and accustomed to bear arms, we have
89. 2 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 143 n.40 (Tucker ed. 1803).
90. Id. at n.41.
91. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 300 app. (Tucker ed. 1803).
92. THE RIGHT To KEEP AND BEAR ARMS, supra note 88, at 7, 60.
93. W. RAWLE, A VIEW OFTHE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (Phil. 1825).
See also, id. (Phil. 1829 ed.).
[Vol. 36:65
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol36/iss1/29
COMMENTARIES
the rudiments of a militia." 9 Rawle continued with the second por-
tion of the amendment:
The corollary, from the first position is that the right of the people
to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed. The prohibition is
general. No clause in the Constitution could by any rule of con-
struction be conceived to give to congress a power to disarm the
people. Such a flagitious attempt could only be made under some
general pretence by a state legislature. But if in any blind pursuit
of inordinate power, either should attempt it, this amendment may
be appealed to as a restraint on both."
However, Rawle pointed out that "[t]his right ought not, however,
in any government, to be abused to the disturbance of the public
peace."'9 An assemblage of persons with arms for an unlawful pur-
pose is an indictable offense. He added that a person carrying arms
abroad "attended with circumstances giving just reason to fear that
he purposes to make an unlawful use of them, would be sufficient
cause to require him to give surety of the peace."97 Thus, his writings
support the notion of a constitutionally guaranteed individual right
to keep and bear arms for other than militia use.
While the second amendment does not refer to infringement by Con-
gress, the Georgia Supreme Court established that it applies directly
to the state by upholding its provisions at a time when the state con-
stitution did not have a provision on arms. Hawkins Nunn was charged
with "having and keeping about his person, and elsewhere, a pistol,
the same not being such a pistol as is known and used as a horseman's
pistol." The court voided the statute on second amendment grounds
and discussed extensively the right to keep and bear arms:
It is true, that these adjudications are all made on clauses in the
State Constitutions; but these instruments confer no new rights on
the people which did not belong to them before. When, I would
ask, did any legislative body in the Union have the right to deny
to its citizens the privilege of keeping and bearing arms in defence
of themselves and their country?
We do not believe that, because the people withheld this arbitrary
power of disfranchisement from Congress, they ever intended to
confer it on the local legislatures.
The right of the whole people, old and young, men, women and
94. Id. at 153 (1829 ed.).
95. Id. at 125-26.
96. Id. at 126.
97. Id.
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boys, and not militia only, to keep and bear arms of every descrip-
tion, and not such merely as are used by the militia, shall not be
infringed, curtailed, or broken upon, in the smallest degree; and
all this for the important end to be attained: the rearing up and
qualifying a well-regulated militia, so vitally necessary to the security
of a free State.98
Nunn's view that the first, fourth, fifth, and sixth amendments apply
to the states is now the law of the land. Hence, the second amendment
does also apply to the states.99
Supreme Court Interpretation
The Court has had occasion to decide four cases on the right to
arms, but three of these came in the nineteenth century and are of
little precedential value because none decide the full scope and mean-
ing of the right. One of these cases, United States v. Cruikshank,'°°
involved a conspiracy by more than a hundred klansmen to deprive
blacks of first and second amendment rights. The Court held that the
first amendment was not "a right granted to the people by the Con-
stitution," and also that the second amendment was not "a right granted
by the Constitution."'' 0 This recognizes the principle that certain rights
98. Nunn v. State, I Ga. 243, 247-51 (1846). The GA. CONST. of 1861, art. I, § 6, finally
adopted a right to arms.
The Nunn decision establishes the correct meaning of the second amendment. Judge Lump-
kin, the author of Nunn, started practicing law in 1820, when Jefferson and Madison were still
alive. He studied at the University of Georgia and Princeton University. He died in 1867. In
view of the times and his age, he probably did not mean children when he used the term "boys"
in Nunn. Judge Lumpkin In Memoriam, 36 Ga. 19 (1867), Letter from Retired Georgia Chief
Justice Bond Almand to author (Oct. 23, 1981).
99. The Supreme Court has not specifically held that the second, third, and seventh amend-
ments, as well as the indictment provision of the fifth and the bail provision of the eighth, apply
to the states. However, recently federal circuit courts have decided that the third amendment
and the bail provision of the eighth amendment apply to the states. Engblom v. Carey, 677
F.2d 957 (2d Cir. 1982) (third amendment); Hunt v. Roth, 648 F.2d 1148 (8th Cir. 1981) (bail),
vac. as moot sub noma. Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478 (1982).
The Supreme Court's initial approach is protecting fundamental rights of speech, press, and
assembly was to employ the fourteenth amendment's due process clause, unrelated to procedural
due process. Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380 (1927); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931);
DeJong v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937). DeJong held that the explicit mention of Congress
in the first amendment does not argue against exclusion of that limitation under the fourteenth
amendment. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940), took a broader approach to
the fundamental concept of liberty embodied in the fourteenth amendment by having it embrace
the liberties guaranteed by the first amendment. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947),
reaffirmed the application of first amendment rights to the states by the fourteenth amendment.
100. 92 U.S. 543 (1876).
101. Id. at 551, 553.
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predate the Constitution and that such rights are guaranteed rather
than granted by a Constitution.02
The Court, however, held that the national government shall not
infringe such rights, and citizens have "to look for their protection
against any violation by their fellow-citizens" to the police power of
the state. Subsequent Supreme Court cases have rendered the Cruikshank
decision a relic of Reconstruction by holding that the first amendment
applies to the states and that private interference with federal constitu-
tional rights may be punished.103
In Presser v. Illinois "" the defendant was prosecuted for leading a
band of armed men in a parade without a license. The Court reaffirmed
Cruikshank's holding that the second amendment applied only to in-
fringement by the federal government. The Court defined the constitu-
tional term "militia" and held that a state could not disarm the people
because the people have a duty to the federal government to maintain
public security and owe militia duties to the federal government.
It is undoubtedly true that all citizens capable of bearing arms con-
stitute the reserved military force or reserve militia of the United
States as well as of the State, and in view of this prerogative of
the general government, as well as of its general powers, the States
cannot, even laying the constitutional provision in question out
of view, prohibit the people from keeping and bearing arms, so
as to deprive the United States of their rightful resource for main-
taining the public security and disable the people from performing
their duty to the general government.'05
102. The right to arms "predates any Constitution of the Commonwealth." Commonwealth
v..Ray, 218 Pa. Super. 72, 272 A.2d 275, 278-79 (1970).
103. United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966) (private interference with federal constitu-
tional rights may be punished); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940) (first amend-
ment applies to states).
104. 116 U.S. 252 (1886).
105. Id. at 265. The opinion essentially held that banning armed marches does not infringe
the right to arms; that even laying the second amendment aside, the people have a right to arms;
and that due process and privileges and immunities add nothing to the right to arms because
the court already held that the law against armed marches does not infringe the right to arms.
In Dunne v. People, 94 I1. 120, 140 (1879), the court held that an act prohibiting armed parades
or drills without a license does not infringe the right to arms for defense of person and property.
The right to arms guarantees of Arizona and Washington contain proscriptions against armed
bodies. ARIZ. CONST., art. 2 § 26; WASH. CONST., art. I § 24.
The Recorder of London on July 24, 1780, opined that an armed association of men could
not assemble together and march where they pleased, for "an affirmative answer would amount
to a dissolution of all government and a subversion of all law." W. BLIZARD, DESULTORY REFLEC-
TIONS ON POLICE: WITH AN ESSAY ON THE MEANS OF PREVENTING CRIMES & AMENDING
CRIMINALS 61 (London 1785). However, he opined that the right to possess arms is an individual
right; "that it cannot be unlawful to learn to use them (for such lawful purposes) with safety
1983]
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Miller v. Texas'°6 cited Presser for the proposition that the second
and fourth amendments'07 did not apply to the states. The Court did
not decide whether those amendments applied to the states through
the fourteenth amendment because that issue "was not set up in the
trial court." 08
In United States v. Miller,'09 the Supreme Court reversed the district
court's sustention of a demurrer and quashing of the indictment on
second amendment grounds:
In the absence of any evidence tending to show that possession
or use of a "shotgun having a barrel of less than eighteen inches
in length" at this time has some reasonable relationship to the
preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia, we cannot
say that the Second Amendment guarantees the right to keep and
bear such an instrument. Certainly it is not within judicial notice
that this weapon is any part of the ordinary military equipment
or that its use could contribute to the common defense."10
The quoted phrase "In the absence of any evidence" is crucial to
the opinion of the Court. The defendants did not appear nor were
they represented before the Supreme Court. Thus the opinion suffers
from a fundamental defect, the Court considering only one view.
Further, the reference to the "common defense" flies in the face of
the historical intent of the amendment: "The Senate refused to limit
the right to bear arms by voting down the addition of the words 'for
the common defense.' ""'
Miller held that:
[T]he Militia comprised all males physically capable of acting in
concert for the common defense. "A body of citizens enrolled for
military discipline." And further, that ordinarily when called for
and effect"; and that "The lawful purposes, for which arms may be used, (besides immediate
self-defence,) are, the suppression of violent and felonious breaches of the peace, the assistance
of the civil magistrates in the execution of the laws, and the defense of the kingdom against
foreign invaders." Id. at 60, 63.
106. 153 U.S. 535 (1894).
107. The fourth amendment now applies to the states through incorporation under the four-
teenth amendment. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (exclusionary rule of fourth amendment
applies to states); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
108. 153 U.S. 535, 538 (1894).
109. 307 U.S. 174 (1939).
110. Id. at 178. The short-barreled shotgun is the modern equivalent of the ancient blunder-
buss. It was not uncommon for a blunderbuss to have a barrel under 18 inches. F. WILKINSON,
ANTQUE FIREARMs 99 (1969). Cf. Burks v. State, 162 Tenn. 406, 36 S.W.2d 892 (1931) (miniature
shotgun with 12 -inch barrel is constitutionally an arm).
111. 1 HISTORY OF THE SuPREmE COURT OF THE UNrrED STATES 450 (J. Goebel, Jr. ed. 1971).
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service these men were expected to appear bearing arms supplied
by themselves and of the kind in common use at the time."2
The Court simply refused to take judicial notice that a particular
shotgun's possession or use had some reasonable relationship to the
preservation or efficiency of a well-regulated militia. The Court made
no finding that the right to arms belonged only to the militia and in
remanding did not suggest that the lower court inquire as to what con-
stitutes the militia in Arkansas, nor did it suggest an inquiry as to the
defendants' able-bodiedness. These factors and the Court's definition
of militia also indicate that a locality rule in judging the breadth of
the second amendment was not adopted."
3
Miller holds that the Constitution protects the right to "possession
or use" of arms having a militia utility, e.g., shotguns, rifles, and pistols.
But the Court was willing to narrow the right by holding that some
shotguns may not be "indispensable." The arms must "[have] some
reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well
regulated militia. . . ." Justice Black has claimed that "only arms
necessary to a well-regulated militia" are absolutely protected."4 At
a minimum, the arms that should be protected are those suitable (not
indispensable) for militia use,"5 because the term "necessary" does
not mean "absolutely or indispensably necessary.""'
The Meaning of the Second Amendment
A Well-regulated Militia
The militia system has always had a dual purpose: availability to
local colonial or state authorities to maintain order in times of internal
112. United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 179 (1939).
113. Cf. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973) (obscenity determined by local rather than
national standards).
114. Black, The Bill of Rights, 35 N.Y.U. L. REV. 865, 873 (1960). Justice Black's individual
rights view has Supreme Court support. In Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857), the Court
included the right "to keep and carry arms wherever they went" as a privilege and immunity.
Id. at 417. It also listed the right to arms in a list of individual rights which Congress could
not deny. Id. at 450. In Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275, 281-82 (1897), the Court, in discussing
individual rights, opined that a law against concealed carrying is not repugnant to the second
amendment, but to admit this exception is to admit there is a fundamental right. In Moore v.
City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 404, 502 (1977), an earlier list of individual rights, including
the right to arms, was approved.
115. As a practical matter, the people carried whatever weapons they commonly had into bat-
tie. Matthews v. State, 237 Ind. 677, 148 N.E.2d 334, 340 (1958) (Emmert, C.J., dissenting);
C. COLBY, REvOLUTIONARY WAR WEAPONS 12 (1963). This included pistols. Id. 11-15.
116. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 413 (1819).
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crisis or disorder, and availability to central authority (be it royal or
federal) in times of war or grave national emergency."'
The Supreme Court has defined militia under the Constitution as
"all citizens or all males capable of bearing arms.""' The militia is
thus more than just the national guard,"19 for the national guard is
but a creature of statute, and a statute may not create or abrogate
a constitutional right. The present national guard statute confers upon
the national government the daily power to evade any claim that the
second amendment grants to the states the right to have armed
militiamen.'20 The sophisticated organization, equipment, and train-
ing of the national guard would indicate that it has undergone a
metamorphosis from being an inclusive and ad hoc militia comprised
of the people to being exclusively professional troops, and the United
States government may prevent the states from keeping troops in times
of peace.'2 ' Nevertheless, the distinction between the militia and the
national guard has been judicially recognized.'22 Thus attempts to limit
the militia to the national guard and in turn to limit the term "people"
to those in the national guard ignore both history and case law.
The belief that the Constitution meant to restrict the ownership of
all arms to members of the armed forces and police is a misconception.
It derives from the unsupported and erroneous claim that the militia
was a regular military formation of some sort, separate and distinct
from the people. This misconception would limit the keeping and bearing
117. U.S. HOME DEFENSE FORCES STUDY, supra note 52, at iii.
118. See note 105, and text at note 112, supra. Numerous state constitutions reflect this view.
E.g., "A militia shall be provided and shall consist of all persons over the age of seven-
teen .. " IND. CONST., art. 12 § 1; "The State militia consists of all able-bodied persons
residing in the State. . " ILL. CONST., art. XII § 1. This comports with anti-Federalist views
that "A militia, when properly formed, are in fact the people themselves .. " and that "the
constitution ought to secure a genuine and guard against a select militia . .," by having the
militia include "all men capable of bearing arms .... " 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 341
(H. J. Storing ed. 1981). The militia is thus more than the national guard.
119. THE RIGHT To KEEP AND BEAR ARMS, supra note 88, at 4-5, 7, 56-59. See also Lane,
The Militia of the U.S., MILITARY REVIEW 13, 15 (Mar. 1982). The militia could not be solely
a creature of statute because colonies from time to time allowed their militia acts to expire,
leaving the colony without a statutory militia. New York, e.g., had no statute between 1769-72
and 1774-75. 4 THE COLONIAL LAWS OF NEW YORK, supra note 33, at 592; id. vol. V at 342-51.
120. Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 7 (1973); 10 U.S.C. §§ 331-333 & 3499-3500 (1971).
121. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 10, cl. 3.
122. Terms "militia" or "militiamen" comprehend every citizen-soldier who in time of war
or emergency forsakes his civilian pursuits for temporary military duty and are not restricted
to the national guard. State ex rel. McGaughey v. Grayton, 349 Mo. 700, 163 S.W.2d 335, 337
(1943) (en banc). The militia is classified into the organized militia and the reserve militia. Id.,
163 S.W.2d at 340. See also People ex rel. Leo v. Hill, 126 N.Y. 497, 504, 27 N.E. 789, 790 (1891).
Numerous statutes make the distinction between the militia and the national guard. See, e.g.,
10 U.S.C. § 311 (1971); 46 CAL. MIL. & VET. CODE § 121 (West 1955); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 27-2 (West 1975); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 30-1-4 (1969).
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of arms to the standing armed forces and the police, the very thing
the Founding Fathers meant to prevent.'23
The second amendment did not grant the states any powers over
their militia that the article I, section 8 militia clause did not already
grant. The power of the states to legislate on militia matters existed
prior to the formation of the Constitution and, not being prohibited
by the Constitution, remains with the states.'24 A state unquestionably
may use its militia to put down an armed insurrection: that power is
essential to the existence of a state.'25 Only the article I, section 10
provision limits this power by forbidding the states to keep standing
troops in time of peace without congressional approval.
In the Second World War the militia proved a successful substitute
for the national guard, which was federalized and activated for overseas
duty. "' Members of the militia, many of whom belonged to gun clubs
and whose ages ranged from 16 to 65, served without pay and provided
their own arms.'27 Their mission was to serve as a local early warning
and intelligence source for regular troops and as a delaying force. Their
training stressed guerrilla tactics, patrolling, demolitions, and roadblock
techniques, and the firepower of some units was impressive.'28
The national government activated the Maryland National Guard
for overseas service. Governor Herbert R. O'Conor then called on men
"of all ages and stations in life" to volunteer for the manning of home
guard stations for the task of "repelling invasion forays, parachute
raids and sabotage uprisings in the state." Before the end of 1943,
15,000 Maryland Minute Men, as these men were designated, manned
home guard stations. These men were expected to bring their own
arms-rifles, shotguns, and pistols-for training and use on guard duty.
At a time when Nazi submarines were sinking American ships off the
Atlantic coast, the fear of invasion was very real.'2 9
The national government also activated the Virginia National Guard
123. MILITARY REviE\V, supra note 119, at 15.
124. Houston v. Moore, 18 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1820). This reflects John Marshall's view that the
states had retained their powers over the militia. 3 ELLIOT's DEBATES, supra note 62, 419-21.
125. Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. 1, 45 (1849). The tenth amendment, furthermore, protects
the reserved powers of a state. Cf. National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
126. U.S. HOME DEFENSE FORCES STUDY, supra note 52, at 32, 34.
127. Id. at 58, 62-63.
128. Id. at 58, 60.
129. Baker, I remember-The "Army" With Men From 16 to 79 [Baltimore] Sun Magazine,
Nov. 16, 1975, at 46; 3 STATE PAPERS & ADDRESSES OF Gov. O'CONOR, supra note 52, at 616-20.
On file with with Oklahoma Law Review are (1) a copy of an honorable discharge certificate
from the WW II Reserve Militia of Maryland (Maryland Minute Men); and (2) an affidavit
from a former Maryland Minute Man swearing that he performed militia duties during WW
II with his personally owned .22 rifle and .32 pistol and that members were required to supply
their own arms, which included rifles, shotguns, pistols, and hunting knives.
1983]
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for overseas duty, thus making it necessary to call upon the local armed
citizenry to perform militia duties. They were variously called the minute
men, the home guard, or the reserve militia. Because a shortage of
arms prompted some members of the militia to borrow .22's from
youngsters, sportsmen with their own guns were especially sought after
for recruitment in the militia: "Since its personnel would have to fur-
nish its own weapons and ammunition, its membership campaign leaned
heavily on sportsmen of the state."'30
All over the country individuals armed themselves in anticipation
of threatened invasion.'3 ' A manual distributed en masse by the War
Department recommended the keeping of "weapons which a guerrilla
in civilian clothes can carry without attracting attention. They must
be easily portable and easily concealed. First among these is the
pistol.",
Historically militia formations were most effective when responding
to obvious threats close to home. They were to harass and impede
the enemy wherever possible and to support friendly formations. Con-
sisting of small tactical formations armed with a wide variety of
weapons, the militia had actually taken the field against the soldiers
of George III. and defeated them. A British officer underestimated the
patriots as "a mob without order or discipline, and very awkward at
handling their arms."'33 The lessons of Vietnam, Nicaragua, Africa,
and the Soviet intervention into Afghanistan illustrate the limitations
of push-button warfare against dispersed small units fighting in their
own territory. The militia's critics tend to ignore this strength and con-
centrate only on the militia's weaknesses. 34 They claim a poorly trained
and ill-equipped citizenry is no match for professional troops. Never-
theless, history demonstrates that a highly motivated but ill-equipped
and poorly trained armed citizenry can wear down and defeat profes-
sional troops in a prolonged war of attrition.
130. M. SCHLEGAL, VIRGINIA ON GUARD-CIVILIAN DEFENSE AND THE STATE MILITIA IN THE
SECOND WORLD WAR 45, 131 (Va. State Lib. 1949).
131. To Arms, TIME, Mar. 30, 1942, at 1.
132. LEVY, GUERRILLA WARFARE 55 (Penguin Books and Infantry J. 1942).
133. THE SPIRIT OF 'SEVENTY-SIX 150 (H. Commager & R.B. Morris eds. 1967). The patriots
were also described as "skillful enough in the use of musket or rifle ... [and] ... better suited
to frontier warefare against the Indians than to the discipline of an army camp." Id. at 151-52.
Therefore, a well-regulated militia means one that has had some training or that at least is
composed of people who have had some training. This is to prevent the militia from becoming
a disorderly mob, dangerous not to the enemy but to its own state and country. In its obsolete
form pertaining to troops, regulated is defined as "properly disciplined." 7 OXFORD ENGLISH
DICTIONARY 380 (1933). Moreover, discipline in relation to arms is defined as "training in the
practice of arms." 3 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 416 (1933).
134. Lane, The Militia of the U.S., MILITARY REVIEW 13, 16 (Mar. 1982).
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The Security of a Free State
The Framers believed that "the right of the people to keep and bear
Arms" would, inter alia, constitute insurance of the continued existence
of a free state through the militia. Moreover, at common law the
maintenance of order was everyone's business, and an armed and active
citizenry was a part of one's social responsibility. All able-bodied men
between the ages of 16 and 60 were subject to the sheriff's summons
for posse duty or to suppress local disorders. For large-scale emergen-
cies, such as invasion or insurrection, a civilian militia was intermittently
mustered for military duty. On a smaller scale, English subjects were
involved in everyday police work. When a crime occurred, citizens were
to raise a "hue and cry" to alert their neighbors and were expected
to pursue the criminals "from town to town, and from county to
county. ' 3 This concept.of public security also advances the "security
of a free State."'36
The People
The term people has been consistently interpreted to mean that the
Constitution protects an individual right, as in the first, fourth, ninth,
135. MALCOLM, supra note 22. "It is the right and duty of a private person to apprehend
one who has committed a felony in his presence, either at the time of its commission or upon
immediate pursuit." Yingst v. Pratt, 139 Ind. App. 695, 220 N.E.2d 276, 280 (1966) (en banc).
Other cases in accord include SueU v. Derricott, 161 Ala. 259, 49 So. 895, 900 (1909); Pond
v. People, 8 Mich. 149, 178 (1860). Chief Justice Cardozo held that not only does every able-
bodied citizen have a duty to aid in the suppression of crime, but this duty to prevent crime
may even extend to being required to have arms to carry out such duty. Babington v. Yellow
Taxi Corp., 250 N.Y. 14, 16-17, 164 N.E. 726, 727 (1928).
The state has the authority to train its able-bodied men so that they may perform military
duties or constabulary duties when called upon. Hamilton v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 293 U.S.
245, 260 (1934).
136. The police have no duty to protect the individual citizen. Weiner v. Metropolitan Transp.
Auth., 55 N.Y.2d 175, 448 N.Y.S.2d 141 (1982); Warren v. District of Columbia, 444 A.2d 1 (D.C.
App. 1981). "[Tlhere is no constituitonal right to be protected by the state against being murdered
by criminals or madmen." Bowers v. Devito, 686 F.2d 616, 618 (7th Cir. 1982). It is common
knowledge that the police are often understaffed and, even where adequately staffed, cannot
possibly be expected always to protect the citizen.
"[L]eft with individuals [is] the exercise of the natural right of self defence, in all those cases
in which the law is either too slow, or too feeble to stay the hand of violence." 2 J. KENT,
COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 12 (1827).
The posse and the militia both comprise able-bodied men and both perform the similar func-
tions of maintaining the public order, with the militia being used exclusively for disorders which
traditional civil authorities are unable to suppress. Despite the existence of a large body of pro-
fessional law enforcement officers, the posse is still occasionally called on to apprehend criminals.
On June 6, 1977, a posse was sent to search for mass-murderer Theodore Robert Bundy follow-
ing his escape from the courthouse in Aspen, Colo. R. LARSEN, BUNDY: THE DELIBERATE
STRANGER 179-82 (1980). Recently a California posse apprehended two robbers. The Armed
Citizen, AM. RIFLEMAN 6 (July 1982).
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and tenth amendments.'37 The only deviation involves the arms right,
and it comes in the seminal case of City of Salina v. Blaksley,'38 which
held that it is solely a collective rather than an individual right. James
Blaksley was convicted of carrying a pistol within the city "while under
the influence of intoxicating liquor." While the conviction could have
been sustained under the general police powers of the state, '3 9 the court
chose "to treat the question [of bearing arms] as an original one."
It misread In re Brickey" ° by claiming that the case sanctioned the
carrying of concealed weapons on constitutional grounds. However,
Brickey merely struck down a statute that forbade the carrying of a
pistol in town in any manner, specifically holding that forbidding the
carrying of concealed weapons would be a valid regulation of the arms
right. The court also misread Commonwealth v. Murphy'4 ' by claim-
ing it "strongly supports the position we have taken." Murphy involved
parading without a license by armed men, and the Murphy court merely
cited Presser v. Illinois' 2 in upholding the conviction.
The collective right holding suffers from a fundamental defect. Aside
from the conceptual difficulty of seeing how something can exist in
a whole without existing in any of its parts, the collectivist holding
essentially claims that there is a nebulous entity that exists somewhere
between the individual and the state that is so important that the Framers
137. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 589 (1980) (fourth amendment); Griswold v. Con-
necticut, 381 U.S. 479, 488-89 (1965) (ninth amendment); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S.
296 (1940) (religion); DeJong v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937) (speech and peaceable assembly);
Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1932) (speech and press). "The use of the words 'the people',
in both these Amendments [ninth and tenth] strongly emphasizes the desire of the Framers to
protect individual liberty." Black, The Bill of Rights, 35 N.Y.U. L. REV. 865, 871 (1960).
138. 72 Kan. 230, 83 P. 619 (1905). The collective right holding has been rejected by other
courts. E.g., see People v. Nakamura, 99 Colo. 262, 62 P.2d 246 (1936) (en banc); State v.
Dawson, 272 N.C. 535, 159 S.E.2d 1, 9 (1968).
139. The prevailing view is that prohibiting the concealed carrying of weapons does not in-
fringe the private right to bear arms guaranteed in the federal and various state constitutions.
"Any one, carrying a weapon for a laudable purpose, will not desire to conceal it." C.
TIEDEMAN, A TREATISE ON THE LnirrAnoNs OF POuCE POWER IN THE UNITED STATES, 13-14, 503
(1886).
The right to arms is subject to regulations to promote the peace, order, and security of society,
"provided they do not nullify the constitutional right or materially embarrass its exercise." E.
FREUND, THE POLICE POWER 90-91 (1904).
"A statute which, under the pretense of regulating, amounts to a destruction of the right,
or which requires arms to be so borne as to render them wholly useless for the purpose of defense,
would be clearly unconstitutional." State v. Reid, 1 Ala. 612, 616, 35 Am. Dec. 44 (1840). This
is an indication that a ban on the ownership of such commonly possessed arms as pistols, shotguns,
or rifles would be clearly unconstitutional, and that a blanket ban on the peaceful, open carrying
of arms would likewise be unconstitutional.
140. 8 Idaho 597, 70 P. 609 (1902).
141. 166 Mass. 171, 44 N.E. 138 (1896).
142. 116 U.S. 252 (1886).
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protected it with a constitutional guarantee.'43 Addressing this ques-
tion of a collectivist limitation on the second amendment, Judge Cooley
wrote the following:
It may be supposed from the phraseology of this provision that
the right to keep and bear arms was only guaranteed to the militia;
but this would be an interpretation not warranted by the intent.
The militia, as has been elsewhere explained, consists of those
persons who, under the law, are liable to the performance of
military duty, and areofficered and enrolled for service when called
upon. But the law many make provision for the enrollment of all
or who are fit to perform military duty, or of a small number only,
or it may wholly omit to make any provision at all; and if the
right were limited to those enrolled, the purpose of this guaranty
might be defeated altogether by the action or neglect to act of the
government it was meant to hold in check. The meaning of the
provision undoubtedly is, that the people, from whom the militia
must be taken, shall have the right to keep and bear arms, and
they need no permission or regulation of law for the purpose. But
this enables the government to have a well regulated militia; for
to bear arms implies something more than the mere keeping; it
implies the learning to handle and use them in a way that makes
those who keep them ready for their efficient use; in other words,
it implies the right to meet for voluntary discipline in arms, observ-
ing in doing so the laws of public order.'44
The collectivist argument should not be followed by the courts because
it has neither historical support nor case law support prior to the Kan-
sas decision, and it is illogical because the very concept of a right,
particularly one contained within the Bill of Rights, is individual.
The principle of rigid stare decisis has no application to an unconstitu-
tional law or to even a course of action taken by the courts. "That
an unconstitutional action has been taken before surely does not render
143. The tenth amendment makes a clear distinction between the people and the state. Therefore,
the people and the state are not interchangeable entities in the second amendment. The collective
right view claims that while all of the people have a right, the individual person has no right.
This essentially means that the second amendment protects no one and guarantees nothing, for
regardless of how clearly unconstitutional a law may be, no individual would have standing to
challenge such a law.
At a minimum, the Framers guaranteed each person the right to keep- arms irrespective of
his relation to the militia because of a possibility foreseen by the Framers that the occasion
might arise when each person would bear arms in the militia. It must be remembered that although
the militia is made up of people, all of the people are not necessarily in the militia. All of the
people are either the constitutional militia or are potentially the constitutional militia; thus each
person has a right to arms.
144. T. COOLEY, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA 298-99 (3d ed. 1898).
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that same action any less unconstitutional at a later date.""'4 On one
occasion, the Court branded a whole line of decisions it had pursued
for nearly a century "an unconstitutional assumption of power by the
courts of the United States which no lapse of time or respectable array
of opinion should make us hesitate to correct."'
'4 6
The term people should be interpreted to include individuals.
However, that does not mean that all individuals have a right to keep
and bear arms. Colonial and English societies of the eighteenth cen-
tury, as well as their modern counterparts, have excluded infants, idiots,
lunatics, and felons.
47
The Right to Keep and Bear Arms
The Framers understood "arms" to mean "Weapons of offence,
or armour of defence." "Armour" was defined as "Defensive arms."'14
8
Constitutionally protected arms are those that were commonly possessed
by the people of the times, including rifles, shotguns, pistols, swords,
knives, and clubs.'
4 9
A number of Revolutionary War figures owned guns: George
Washington, Thomas Jefferson, and James Madison.' Washington
owned as many as 50 guns, including handguns.'5' Jefferson owned
some 25 guns, including a pair of screw-barrelled pocket pistols.'
There is a movement to ban handguns in this country. Nevertheless,
handguns are constitutionally protected arms.'53 Pistols were used during
145. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 546-47 (1969).
146. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 79 (1938). See also Monell v. Department of Social
Serv. of N.Y. City, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). Cf. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954)
to Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
147. T. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 57 (7th ed. 1903). The early
Florida, Tennessee, and Louisiana guarantees on arms restricted it to "free white men." FLA.
CONST., art. I § 21 (1838); TENN. CONST., art. I § 26 (1834); LA. CONT., tit. III, art. 60 (1845).
The passage of the thirteenth and fourteenth amendments would indicate that, save for felons,
the mentally infirm, and persons of tender years, all of the people may now enjoy the right to arms.
148. DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE, supra note 54.
149. Examples are State v. Kerner, 181 N.C. 574, 107 S.E. 222, 224 (1921) (rifle, musket,
shotgun, and pistols); State v. Kessler, 289 Or. 359, 614 P.2d 94, 98 (1980) (firearms, hatchets,
swords, knives, and billy clubs); State v. Duke, 42 Tex. 455, 458-59 (1875) ("such arms as are
commonly kept, according to customs of the people, and are appropriate for open and manly
use in self-defense, as well as such as are proper for the defense of the State," and include
the shotgun, rifle, and "holster pistol"). Duke was cited in United States v. Miller, 307 U.S.
174, 182 n.3 (1939).
150. See note 63, supra.
151. Halsey, George Washington's Favorite Guns, Am. RIFLEMAN, Feb. 1968, at 23.
152. See note 63, supra.
153. Numerous vintage and modern cases hold explicitly or implicitly that a handgun is an
arm in a constitutional sense. Wilson v. State, 33 Ark. 557 (1878); Rinzler v. Carson, 262 So.
2d 661, 666 (Fla. 1972); In re Brickey, 8 Idaho 597, 70 P. 609 (1902); Schubert v. DeBard,
398 N.E.2d 1339 (Ind. App. 1980) (motion to transfer denied 8-28-1980); State v. Bias, 37 La.
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the Revolutionary War, and not just by officers. "[T]he pistol was
the principal firearm of a small yet important body of enlisted men."
The cavalry, the navy, and selected infantry regiments all used pistols.'54
The first federal militia statute mentioned pistols,'5I and colonial laws
more generally also considered pistols legitimate arms.1
5 6
The continued usefulness of the pistol to modern militia is beyond
cavil: the army is soliciting offers for the purchase of 217,439 9mm
pistols with a maximum length of 8.7 inches,'5 7 and the pistol is used
by every armed force in the world.' 8
The Oregon Supreme Court defined what constitutes arms in a con-
stitutional sense in State v. Kessler:
[ihe term "arms" as used by the drafters of the constitutions prob-
ably was intended to include those weapons used by settlers for
both personal and military defense. The term "arms" was not
limited to firearms, but included several handcarried weapons com-
monly used for defense. The term "arms" would not have in-
cluded cannon or other heavy ordnance not kept by militiamen
or private citizens ...
[A]dvanced weapons of modem warfare have never been intended
for personal possession and protection. When the constitutional
drafters referred to an individual's "right to bear arms," the arms
used by the militia and for personal protection were basically the
same weapons. Modern weapons used exclusively by the military
Ann. 259, 260 (1885); People v. Zerillo, 219 Mich. 635, 189 N.E. 927 (1922); Taylor v. McNeal,
523 S.W.2d 148, 150 (Mo. App. 1975); State v. Nickerson, 126 Mont. 157, 247 P.2d 188, 192
(1952); City of Las Vegas v. Moberg, 82 N.M. 626, 485 P.2d 737 (Ct. App. 1971); State v.
Kerner, 181 N.C. 574, 107 S.E. 222, 224 (1921) ("historical use of pistols as 'arms' of offense
and defense is beyond controversy . . ."); Glasscock v. City of Chattanooga, 157 Tenn. 518,
11 S.W.2d 678 (1928); Andrews v. State, 50 Tenn. 165 (1871) ("the pistol known as the repeater
is a soldier's weapon . . ."); State v. Duke, 42 Tex. 455, 458-59 (1875); State v. Rosenthal,
75 Vt. 295, 55 A. 610 (1903). A pistol is not an arm that serves no lawful purpose. Pistols
have a variety of legitimate uses. Commonwealth v. McHarris, 246 Pa. Super. 488, 371 A.2d
941, 943-44 (1977). See also Sturm, Ruger & Co. v. Bloyd, 586 S.W.2d 19, 22 (Ky. 1979) ("revolver
... not ... unsafe for general use").
154. The largest manufacturer of pistols was the Rappahannock Forge in Falmouth, Va.
Peterson, Pistols in the American Revolution, AM. RIFLEMAN, Oct. 1955, at 31.
155. 1 Stat. 271, 272 (1792).
156. See note 34, supra. Also, Connecticut's 1678 militia law referred to a "case of pistolls
and holsters." 3 THE PuBLIc IcORDOs OF THE COLONY OF CoaNEcTcutr 12, 295 (H. Trumbell
ed. 1859). New Jersey's 1744 law referred to "a Case of Pistols." 6 DocUrENTs RELATiNG TO
COLONIAL HisTORY OF NEw JEasay 193 (V. Whitehead ed. 1882). A 1701 Rhode Island law
referred to "pistol." 3 RECORDS OF THE COLONY OF RHODE IsLAND 433 (J. Bartlett ed. 1856). Pistols
were even used in the Boston Tea Party. AMERICAN HISTORY TOLD By CONTEMPORARIES 433
(A.B. Hart ed. 1926).
157. Service Pistol Update, Am. RIFLEMAN, Sept. 1981, at 30. The modern military pistol is
smaller in size than ancient military pistols because of modern metallurgy and smokeless powder.
158. W.H.B. SMITH, SMALL ARMS OF THE WORLD passim (E. Ezell ed., l1th rev. ed. 1977).
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are not "arms" which are commonly possessed by individuals for
defense, therefore, the term "arms" in the constitution does not
include such weapons.
If the text and purpose of the constitutional guarantee relied ex-
clusively on the preference for a militia "for defense of the State,"
then the term "arms" most likely would include only the modern
day equivalents of the weapons used by colonial militiamen."19
The right to keep arms is a private, individual right guaranteed to
the citizen and not the militiaman. '6G After all, the militia could bear
arms belonging to a governmental body or belonging to individual
members. Furthermore, while the militia is made up of people, all people
are not in the militia. Public servants, for example, were not in the
militia. 6' Nevertheless, even persons exempt from militia duties were
required to keep arms.6"
In Tennessee the right to keep and bear arms is guaranteed for the
"common defense.'I63 In Andrews v. State,1' the Tennessee court held
that the right to keep arms is an individual right:
IThe right to keep them, with all that is implied fairly as an in-
cident to this right, is a private individual right guaranteed to the
citizen not the soldier .... The passage from [Justice] Story shows
clearly that this right was intended, as we have maintained in this
opinion, and was guaranteed to and to be exercised and enjoyed
by the citizen as such, and not by him as a soldier, or in defense
solely of his political rights.'
6
This rule was laid down even though the court believed that the militia,
as an organization, had passed away in almost every state and remained
as a memory of the past, probably never to be revived. 66 The later
experiences of the Second World War proved that view incorrect. 67
159. 289 Or. 359, 614 P.2d 94, 98-99 (1980).
160. Andrews v. State, 50 Tenn. 165, 182 (1871).
161. 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 62, at 425-26. A person exempt from militia duty can-
not be disarmed because he is still 1potentially a militiaman. He also may keep arms for self-
defense and other normal uses. See notes 4 & 6 supra.
162. See note 37, supra.
163. Art. I § 26.
164. 50 Tenn. 165, 182, 183-84 (1871). Right to keep arms includes purchasing arms and am-
munition, keeping arms in repair, and using arms for ordinary purposes. Id. at 178.
The right to bear arms has been defined: "When we see a man with musket to shoulder,
carbine slung on back, or pistol belted to his side, or such like, he is bearing arms in the constitu-
tional sense." State v. Bias, 37 La. Ann. 259, 260 (1885). LA. CONST., Bill of Rights art. 3
(1879) tracked language of second amendment.
165. Andrews v. State, 50 Tenn. 165, 184 (1871).
166. Id.
167. See notes 52, 126-132, supra.
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Most important, the Andrews court chose to carry out the intent
of a constitutional guarantee, rather than to nullify the right to keep
and bear arms on policy grounds and tailor the decision to suit the
perceived needs of the moment and serve it with judicial dressing. More
recently a court voided a statute with this comment:
We are not unmindful that there is current controversy over the
wisdom of a right to bear arms, and that the original motivations
for such a provision might not seem compelling if debated as a
new issue. Our task, however, in construing a constitutional pro-
vision is to respect the principles given the status of constitutional
guarantees and limitations by the drafters; it is not to abandon
these principles when this fits the needs of the moment.'16
The Right Shall Not Be Infringed
The term infringe means to defeat, to frustrate, to violate, to destroy,
or to hinder.69 The Framers chose to command that the right to arms
not be infringed and thus guaranteed the right to keep and bear arms,
even though they were aware of crime. They balanced the interests
in guaranteeing the arms right, 7" for it is clear that the colonies were
not free from crime. For example, in 1630 the pilgrims at Plymouth
colony hanged John Billington for murdering John Newcomen with
a blunderbuss; in 1678, Thomas Hellier was hanged in Westover,
Virginia, for hacking three people to death; Thomas Lutherland was
hanged February 23, 1691, in New Jersey for murdering John Clark,
a boat trader, and stealing his supplies; and Alexander White was hanged
at Cambridge, Massachusetts, on November 18, 1784, for murder and
piracy.'7 ' The Framers apparently felt that crime must be prevented
by "the penitentiary and gallows, and not by a general deprivation
of a constitutional privilege.
' ' 
172
168. State v. Kessler, 289 Or. 359, 614 P.2d 94, 95 (1980).
169. This is the common dictionary definition, found in dictionaries dating from 1755 to the
present.
170. In 1771 a small-scale civil war broke out as a result of the Regulator movement in North
Carolina. Nine members of the militia and nine Regulators were killed. Six Regulators were hanged
for treason. 1 AMERICAN HISTORY, supra note 25, at 95. Daniel Shays' rebellion was quelled
in January, 1787. Several of his men were killed in a clash with militiamen. Shays and his lieutenants
were subsequently pardoned. Id. at 136. Thomas Jefferson was not alarmed: George Washington,
while not taking the news so calmly, refused to listen to renewed suggestions that he make himself
a military dictator. Id. at 142. The Bill of Rights took effect in 1791. Id. at 149.
"[A]rguments of policy must give way to a constitutional command .... " Payton v. New
York, 445 U.S. 573, 602 (1980).
171. J.R. NASH, BLOODLETTERS AND BADMEN 55, 255, 345, 606 (1973).
172. Wilson v. State, 33 Ark. 557, 560 (1878).
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Conclusion
The right to arms may not be undercut simply because some per-
sons at the moment consider it a troublesome right. Nor can a con-
stitutional right be made dependent upon a popular consensus that
there is a continued need for it. Though the Bill of Rights can expand
to meet the needs of the times, it cannot contract to fit the per-
ceived needs of the moment. A too restrictive approach would restrict
the right to an absurd point, protecting flintlock firearms but not
modern cartridge arms.'7
The second amendment should apply to the states by incorporation
through the fourteenth amendment. The second amendment right, whose
roots go back an immeasurable period of time to the natural right of
self-defense, is and always has been a fundamental one. The right to
keep and bear arms has been firmly established in our concept of
"liberty" under the due process clause.'74
A court should not hesitate in declaring an arms statute unconstitu-
tional, for the courts have struck down statutes or ordinances limiting
the right to keep and bear arms on at least seventeen occasions.'"7 The
173. A too-restrictive approach would undercut other rights. The protections of the Bill of
Rights must be brought into harmony with the times. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967)
(fourth amendment protection extends to recording of oral statements made in a telephone booth).
Thus self-loading rifles, shotguns, and pistols are protected arms but machine guns are not. Rinzler
v. Carson, 262 So. 2d 661, 666 (Fla. 1972).
174. For a detailed discussion demonstrating the logic of incorporation, see Halbrook, The
Jurisprudence of the Second and Fourteenth Amendments, 4 GEO. MASON L. REv. 1 (1981).
Thirty-nine state constitutions contain a right to arms. This would indicate that the right is
fundamental. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794-96 (1969). (State constitutions are to be
considered in incorporation process). The right to arms guarantees of early state constitutions
were cited in demanding a Bill of Rights. 5 THE COMPLETE ANTi-FEDERALIST 26 (H.J. Storing
ed. 1981).
In the absence of a full briefing, comments about the second amendment and its application
to the states are unwise and are obiter dictum. State v. Vlacil, 645 P.2d 677, 681 n.1 (Utah
1982) (Oakes, J., concurring).
See the Appendix for a list of the state constitutions.
175. Wilson v. State, 33 Ark. 557- (1878); City of Lakewood v. Pillow, 180 Colo. 20, 23,
501 P.2d 744, 745 (1972) (en banc); People v. Nakamura, 99 Colo. 262, 62 P.2d 246 (1936)
(en banc); Nunn v. State, 1 Ga. (I Kelly) 243 (1846); In re Brickey, 8 Idaho 597, 70 P. 609
(1902); Bliss v. Commonwealth, 12 Ky. (2 Litt.) 90 (1822); People v. Zerillo, 219 Mich. 635,
189 N.W. 927 (1922); City of Las Vegas v. Moberg, 82 N.M. 626, 485 P.2d 737 (Ct. App.
1971); State v. Kerner, 181 N.C. 574, 107 S.E. 222 (1921); In re Reilly, 31 Ohio Dec. 364 (C.P.
1919); State v. Blocker, 291 Or. 255, 630 P.2d 824 (1981); State v. Kessler, 289 Or. 359, 614
P.2d 94 (1980); Glasscock v. City of Chattanooga, 157 Tenn. 518, 11 S.W.2d 678 (1928); An-
drews v. State, 50 Tenn. 165 (1871); Smith v. Ishenhour, 43 Tenn. 214, 217 (1866); Jennings
v. State, 5 Tex. Crim. App. 298 (1878); State v. Rosenthal, 75 Vt. 295, 55 A. 610 (1903).
Furthermore, "constitutional rights may not be denied simply because of hostility to their
assertion or exericse." Watson v. City of Memphis, 373 U.S. 526, 535 (1963). "[The Constitution
of the United States] was not intended to provide merely for the exigencies of a few years, but
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intent of the Framers and the historical surroundings of their time man-
date the voiding of (1) any law that infringes the right of the people
(excepting those people who fall into a traditional high-risk category,
such as felons, the mentally deficient, and infants) to keep any arms
commonly used for personal protection or any of the modem equivalent
of arms that were fairly commonly possessed by the people at the adop-
tion of the Constitution, or (2) any law that infringes the right to bear
those arms for traditional lawful purposes.
was to endure through a long lapse of ages. .. ." Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.)
304, 326 (1816).
The law must be followed although the court experiences no satisfaction with the result, for
"this is a court of law and not a theological institution." Oleff v. Hodapp, 129 Ohio St. 432,
195 N.E. 838, 841 (1935).
Constitutional activism that destroys a right is particularly dangerous because it changes the
law of the land without the consent of the governed and nullifies article V of the United States
Constitution.
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APPENDIX
STATE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS ON THE
RIGHT TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS
Thirty-nine states have constitutional provisions on the right to keep
and bear arms.
Alabama: That every citizen has a right to bear arms in defense of
himself and the state. Article I, section 26.
Alaska: A well-regulated militia being necessary to the security of
a free state, the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not
be infringed. Article I, section 19.
Arizona: The right of the individual citizen to bear arms in defense
of himself or the State shall not be impaired, but nothing in this sec-
tion shall be construed as authorizing individuals or corporations to
organize, maintain, or employ an armed body of men. Article 2,
section 26.
Arkansas: The citizens of this State shall have the right to keep and
bear arms for their common defense. Article II, section 5.
Colorado: The right of no person to keep and bear arms in defense
of his home, person and property, or in aid of the civil power when
thereto legally summoned, shall be called in question; but nothing herein
contained shall be construed to justify the practice of carrying con-
cealed weapons. Article II, section 13.
Connecticut: Every citizen has a right to bear arms in defense of
himself and the state. Article I, section 15.
Florida: The right of the people to keep and bear arms in defense
of themselves and of the lawful authority of the state shall not be in-
fringed, except that the manner of bearing arms may be regulated by
law. Article I, section 8.
Georgia: The right of the people to keep and bear arms, shall not
be infringed, but the General Assembly shall have power to prescribe
the manner in which arms may be borne. Article I, section I, para. v.
Hawaii: A well regulated militia being necessary to the security of
a free state, the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not
be infringed. Article I, section 15.
Idaho: The people have the right to keep and bear arms, which right
shall not be abridged; but this provision shall not prevent the passage
of laws to govern the carrying of weapons concealed on the person
nor prevent passage of legislation providing minimum sentences for
crimes committed while in possession of a firearm, nor prevent passage
of legislation providing penalties for the possession of firearms by a
convicted felon, nor prevent the passage of legislation punishing the
use of a firearm. No law shall impose licensure, registration or special
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taxation on the ownership or possession of firearms or ammunition.
Nor shall any law permit the confiscation of firearms, except those
actually used in the commission of a felony. Article I, section 11.
Illinois: Subject only to the police power, the right of the individual
citizen to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed. Article I, section 22.
Indiana: The people shall have a right to bear arms, for the defense
of themselves and the State. Article I, section 32.
Kansas: The people have the right to bear arms for their defense
and security; but standing armies, in time of peace, are dangerous to
liberty, and shall not be tolerated, and the military shall be in strict
subordination to the civil power. Kansas Bill of Rights, section 4.
Kentucky: All men are, by nature, free and equal, and have certain
inherent and inalienable rights, among which may be reckoned: . . .
7. The right to bear arms in defense of themselves and of the state,
subject to the power of the general assembly to enact laws to prevent
persons from carrying concealed weapons. Kentucky Bill of Rights,
section I, para. 7.
Louisiana: The right of each citizen to keep and bear arms shall
not be abridged, but this provision shall not prevent the passage of
laws to prohibit the carrying of weapons concealed on the person. Ar-
ticle I, section 11.
Maine: Every citizen has a right to keep and bear arms for the com-
mon defence; and this right shall never be questioned. Article I, sec-
tion 16.
Massachusetts: The people have a right to keep and bear arms for
the common defence. And as, in times of peace, armies are dangerous
to liberty, they ought not to be maintained without the consent of the
legislature; and the military power shall always be held in an exact
subordination to the civil authority, and be governed by it.
Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, part I, article XVII.
Michigan: Every person has a right to keep and bear arms for the
defense of himself and the state. Article I, section 6.
Mississippi: The right of every citizen to keep and bear arms in
defense of his home, person, or property, or in aid of the civil power
where thereto legally summoned, shall not be called in question, but
the legislature may regulate or forbid carrying concealed weapons. Ar-
ticle 3, section 12.
Missouri: That the right of every citizen to keep and bear arms in
defense of his home, person and property, or when lawfully summoned
in aid of the civil power, shall not be questioned; but this shall not
justify the wearing of concealed weapons. Article I, section 23.
Montana: The right of any person to keep or bear arms in defense
of his own home, person, and property, or in aid of the civil power
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when thereto legally summoned, shall not be called in question, but
nothing herein contained shall be held to permit the carrying of con-
cealed weapons. Article II, section 12.
Nevada: Every citizen has the right to keep and bear arms for security
and defense, for lawful hunting and recreational use and for other lawful
purposes. Article I, section 11, para. 1.
New Hampshire: All persons have the right to keep and bear arms
in defense of themselves, their families, their property, and the state.
Part First, article 2a.
New Mexico: No law shall abridge the right of the citizen to keep
and bear arms for security and defense, for lawful hunting and recrea-
tional use and for other lawful purposes, but nothing herein shall be
held to permit the carrying of concealed weapons. Article II, section 6.
North Carolina: A well regulated militia being necessary to the securi-
ty of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall
not be infringed; and, as standing armies in time of peace are dangerous
to liberty, they shall not be maintained, and the military shall be kept
under strict subordination to, and governed by, the civil power. Nothing
herein shall justify the practice of carrying concealed weapons, or pre-
vent the General Assembly from enacting penal statutes against that
practice. Article I, section 30.
Ohio: The people have the right to bear arms for their defense and
security; but standing armies, in time of peace, are dangerous to liberty,
and shall not be kept up; and the military shall be in strict subordina-
tion to the civil power. Article I, section 4.
Oklahoma: The right of a citizen to keep and bear arms in defense
of his home, person, or property, or in aid of the civil power, when
thereunto legally summoned, shall never be prohibited; but nothing
herein contained shall prevent the Legislature from regulating the carry-
ing of weapons. Article 2, section 26.
Oregon: The people shall have the right to bear arms for the defence
of themselves, and the State, but the Military shall be kept in strict
subordination to the civil power. Article I, section 27.
Pennsylvania: The right of the citizens to bear arms in defence of
themselves and the State shall not be questioned. Article I, section 21.
Rhode Island: The right of the people to keep and bear arms shall
not be infringed. Article I, section 22.
South Carolina: A well regulated militia being necessary to the securi-
ty of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall
not be infringed. As, in times of peace, armies are dangerous to liberty,
they shall not be maintained without the consent of the General
Assembly. The military power of the State shall always be held in subor-
dination to the civil authority and be governed by it. No soldier shall
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in time of peace be quartered in any house without the consent of
the owner nor in time of war but in the manner prescribed by law.
Article I, section 20.
South Dakota: The right of the citizens to bear arms in defense of
themselves and the state shall not be denied. Article VI, section 24.
Tennessee: That the citizens of this State have a right to keep and
bear arms for their common defense; but the Legislature shall have
power, by law, to regulate the wearing of arms with a view to pre-
vent crime. Article I, section 26.
Texas: Every citizen shall have the right to keep and bear arms in
the lawful defence of himself or the State; but the Legislature shall
have power, by law, to regulate the wearing of arms, with a view to
prevent crime. Article I, section 23.
Utah: The people have the right to bear arms for their security and
defense, but the Legislature may regulate the exercise of this right by
law. Article I, section 6.
Vermont: That the people have a right to bear arms for the defence
of themselves and the State-and as standing armies in time of peace
are dangerous to liberty, they ought not to be kept up; and that the
military should be kept under strict subordination to and governed by
the civil power. Chapter I, article 16.
Virginia: That a well regulated militia, composed of the body of
the people, trained to arms, is the proper, natural, and safe defense
of a free state, therefore, the right of the people to keep and bear
arms shall not be infringed; that standing armies, in time of peace,
should be avoided as dangerous to liberty; and that in all cases the
military should be under strict subordination to, and governed by, the
civil power. Article I, section 13.
Washington: The right of the individual citizen to bear arms in
defense of himself, or the state, shall not be impaired, but nothing
in this section shall be construed as authorizing individuals or corpora-
tions to organize, maintain, or employ an armed body of men. Article
I, section 24.
Wyoming: The right of citizens to bear arms in defense of themselves
and of the state shall not be denied. Article I, section 24.
STATES WITHOUT CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
Eleven states do not have a constitutional provision on arms:
California, Delaware, Iowa, Maryland, Minnesota, Nebraska, New
Jersey, New York, North Dakota, West Virginia, and Wisconsin.
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